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Abstract
I study how to model various strategic interactions with incomplete infor-
mation and how to properly analyze them. The first chapter of the dis-
sertation suggests new solution concepts for incomplete information games
that are preceded by communication opportunities. Second chapter, written
with Tilman Bo¨rgers, studies type spaces that model incomplete information
among players with a specific property: the independence property. Third
chapter suggests a new behavioral model to study real world decision makers’
behavior in specific games.
In the first chapter, I suggest new solution concepts for incomplete infor-
mation games that are preceded by communication opportunities (communi-
cation games) in order to solve the following problem: traditional equilibrium
analysis for communication games does not properly incorporate and explain
uncertainties about players’ communication strategies, and so it excludes
plausible outcomes of communication games from the set of equilibrium out-
comes. Thus, I define correlated cheap talk equilibrium for games with cheap
talk opportunities, and correlated communication equilibrium for games with
general communication opportunities. New definitions suggested in this pa-
per are extensions of Aumann’s (1974) definition of correlated equilibrium
for complete information games to communication games. Following Au-
mann’s (1987) epistemic justification of the correlated equilibrium, I provide
epistemic justifications of new definitions. That is, new definitions represent
vii
the common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common
prior for a given communication game. Then I compare new definitions with
other correlated equilibrium definitions for incomplete information games.
In the second chapter, we study common prior type spaces in which for
each agent the agent’s payoff type and the agent’s belief type are independent.
Such type spaces deserve attention as the polar opposites of common prior
type spaces in which agents’ beliefs determine their preferences - a class of
type spaces whose special properties are much studied. We find a necessary
and sufficient condition for the independence of each agent’s payoff type and
belief type. Different agents’ payoff types must be independent. Agents
may hold payoff irrelevant information. The payoff irrelevant signals that
agents receive may be correlated with each other, but they must be jointly
independent of all agents’ payoff types. We conclude that type spaces with
independent payoff types, as commonly used in game theory and mechanism
design, constitute, up to payoff irrelevant information, the class of all type
spaces in which payoff types and belief types are independent for each agent.
In the third chapter, I suggest a modified cognitive hierarchy (CH) model
which improves on the original CH model by Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004).
Players are endowed with cognitive types which characterize their iterative
reasoning abilities. Unlike the original CH model, the cognitive type space
has a common prior, so players know the existence of equal or higher type
players. In order to estimate equal or higher type players’ choices, which
are impossible for correct anticipation, players use other players’ past choice
data. Players utilize additional information and improve their estimation
if all other players’ individual choice data are given, compared to the case
where only other players’ aggregate choice data are given. Some experimental
findings support the modified CH model. First, Sbriglia’s (2009) experimen-
tal findings about repeated beauty contest game suggest that the modified
CH model improves on the original CH model. Second, Duffy and Hop-
viii
kins’ (2005) experimental findings show that the modified CH model might
provide better explanation about repeated market entry game compared to
other learning models, the replicator dynamics and the fictitious play.
ix
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A communication game is a 2-stage game in which a simultaneous move
incomplete information game is preceded by a communication opportunity
among players. There are 2 sources of uncertainties associated with infor-
mative messages in communication games. For example, suppose the Fed
announces that “the U.S. labor market conditions are nearly normal,” which
is an informative message about relevant uncertainty - in this case the U.S.
unemployment rate. Consider a 2 stage game in which the Fed sends a mes-
sage, then observers of the Fed’s message choose actions. In that game, an
observer cannot pinpoint what the Fed knows about the unemployment rate
after observing the above message for two reasons. First, one might not know
in which context the Fed uses the message “nearly normal”: the Fed might
say nearly normal when the unemployment rate is inside the range of 1-3
1
percent or inside the range of 2-4 percent. That is, an observer might be un-
certain about the Fed’s messaging strategy, so he might be uncertain about
how to interpret a given message. Second, even if an observer knows the
Fed’s messaging strategy and the exact range of unemployment rates associ-
ated with “nearly normal,” the exact unemployment rate inside a given range
is unknown. In the 2-stage game between the Fed and observers, both types
of uncertainties might be relevant when players choose optimal strategies.
In the literature, existing works analyze either the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium or the sequential equilibrium for communication games.1 For exam-
ple, Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyzed the cheap talk equilibrium, which
is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a cheap talk game: a 2-stage game in
which a 2-player incomplete information game is preceded by a cheap talk
communication opportunity. However, analyzing the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of communication games implies that there is no uncertainty about
messaging strategies. For example, in the communication game just de-
scribed between the Fed and observers, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
there is no uncertainty about the Fed’s messaging strategy. That is, in any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the exact range associated with the message
“nearly normal” is known and fixed. Likewise, in the equilibrium analysis
provided by Crawford and Sobel (1982), only the second source of uncertain-
ties is incorporated and explained by the cheap talk equilibrium, which is
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a given cheap talk game.
In this paper, I show that the first source of uncertainties, the uncer-
tainties about messaging strategies, can be incorporated into formal equi-
librium analysis by considering special forms of correlated equilibrium for
1The sequential equilibrium is a refinement of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for
general extensive form games, resulting in a smaller set of equilibrium outcomes. This
paper is not about equilibrium refinement from perfect Bayesian equilibrium to sequential
equilibrium; rather it is about introducing new equilibrium definitions that give larger sets
of equilibrium outcomes than the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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communication games. Accordingly, I suggest two new solution concepts
for multi-player incomplete information games, correlated cheap talk equilib-
rium for incomplete information games extended by cheap talk opportunities2
and correlated communication equilibrium for incomplete information games
extended by general communication opportunities.3 Also, analyzing such
correlated equilibria of communication games will generate strictly larger
equilibrium predictions compared to the equilibrium prediction based on the
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. That is, introducing new solution concepts
enables us to have new equilibrium outcomes, which were not analyzed and
explained by the traditional equilibrium analysis of communication games.
In communication games, larger sets of equilibrium outcomes are pro-
vided by analyzing the correlated cheap talk equilibrium or the correlated
communication equilibrium, rather than the perfect Baysian equilibrium of
communication games. New definitions introduced in this paper are exten-
sions of Aumann’s (1974) correlated equilibrium for one-shot complete infor-
mation games to 2-stage incomplete information games with communication
opportunities. After introducing new equilibrium definitions, I give epistemic
justifications for new definitions, thereby extending Aumann’s (1987) epis-
temic justification for correlated equilibrium for complete information games
to communication games. Detailed discussions are provided in sections 3 and
4.
I start the discussion of this paper by introducing a 2-player incomplete
information game preceded by a cheap talk communication opportunity in
which all perfect Bayesian equilibria entail no meaningful communication
between players. Due to possible uncertainties about messaging strategies,
a new equilibrium arises with meaningful communication when we analyze a
2By cheap talk, I refer to a communication protocol in which, prior to the given incom-
plete information game, all players simultaneously exchange one-shot public messages.
3The general communication opportunities represent every possible communication
protocol that might precede a given incomplete information game.
3
correlated equilibrium of the given communication game.
A motivating example
Consider an incomplete information game as follows. There are two play-
ers, S, the speaker (male), and L, the listener (female). The speaker, who
is the manager of a firm, privately observes θ ∈ Θ ≡ {nc, c}, where Θ is
the set of relevant states of the world. Θ is associated with common prior
p = (0.6, 0.4), where 0.6 is the probability of nc. State c represents an im-
minent crisis for the business, and nc represents no such crisis. The listener
is the owner of the firm without private information. She chooses an action
from the set A ≡ {sq, f, supp}, where sq represents maintaining the status
quo, f represents firing the manager, and supp represents providing more
support to the manager.
The speaker’s utility does not depend on θ ∈ Θ. It is given by uS : A→ R
such that uS(sq) = 3, uS(f) = 0, uS(supp) = 7. That is, the manager likes
to have more support from the owner of the firm, dislikes being fired, and
ranks the status quo between these two outcomes.
The listener’s utility uL : Θ × A → R depends on both the state of
the world and the chosen action as follows: uL(nc, sq) = 4, uL(nc, f) =
0, uL(nc, supp) = 3, uL(c, sq) = 0, uL(c, f) = 4, uL(c, supp) = 2. If there is
no crisis, the owner prefers maintaining the status quo to give more support
to the manager. Firing the manager will disrupt the business, and so it is
least preferred. However, if there is an imminent crisis for the business, the
owner prefers to fire the manager. If the owner does not fire the manager,
she wants to give the manager more support in response to the crisis. Note
that if the owner is uncertain about the state of the world - that is, if she
has some intermediate beliefs - it may be optimal to provide more support
to the manager.
Now let the above game be extended by a cheap talk opportunity a` la
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Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the manager speaks first and then the
owner chooses an action. It is easy to see that in all perfect Bayesian equilib-
ria of this game, the owner chooses an action strategy regardless of received
messages. No communication is possible because the speaker’s utility does
not depend on the state of the world.4 However, I suggest an equilibrium in
which fully rational players use pure strategies with meaningful communica-
tion and players are possibly uncertain about meanings and interpretations
of messages.
First, I give a formal description of such an equilibrium, and then I provide
an intuitive explanation. I will consider a form of correlated equilibrium of
the cheap talk game, in which a mediator gives out extra signals to players
before players play the cheap talk game. After the original state of the world
θ ∈ Θ is realized, a mediator, knowing the state, sends extra signals to players
as follows. When the state of the world is nc, the speaker observes a signal
from the set {1, 2}, and the listener observes a signal from the set {`, r}. The










Figure 1.1: Distribution of extra signals conditional on state nc
When the state of the world is c, then the speaker always observes signal
4There could be equilibria in which different speaker types choose different mixed strate-
gies, but this would require that the listener’s updated conditional beliefs over messages
induce same action strategy for all received messages. In this case, speaker types have
different strategies and messages contain some information, but that information is not
utilized in the equilibrium. I also describe such equilibria as equilibria that lack meaningful
communication.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of extra signals conditional on state c
The joint distribution of states of the world and additional signals can
be represented by the extended type space depicted in Figure 3, where the
speaker observes the row and the listener observes the column. Note that
observations of additional signals do not change the beliefs of players about
the underlying states of the world, Θ. For the speaker, this is so because he
knows the state of the world. For the listener, the probability of receiving `
or r is the same in both underlying states of the world. Therefore, listener
types ` and r share same beliefs about Θ, which is the same as the common
prior p. In the literature this property of additional signals is called “belief
invariance.” Belief invariance of extra signals implies that in the extended
type space, as in Figure 3, listener types ` and r, and speaker types nc, 1
and nc, 2, share the same belief hierarchies over Θ. I have thus introduced
what the literature calls “redundant” types, which describe types that have
the same belief hierarchies in a type space.5
I describe an equilibrium of the cheap talk game wherein players receive
the information described in Figure 3. In contrast to any perfect Bayesian
5A player’s belief over Θ is called the first order belief, and a player’s belief over the
set of possible beliefs over Θ by the other player together with his first order belief is
called the second order belief. Likewise, we can define the nth order belief for any natural
number n, and a combination of all possible nth order beliefs is called a belief hierarchy of
a player with respect to Θ. In a type space, two types that share the same belief hierarchy
are called redundant types. Types ` and r, and (nc, 1) and (nc, 2) are redundant types in
the type space given by Figure 3.
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` r
nc, 1 0.2 0.1
nc, 2 0.1 0.2
c, 3 0.2 0.2
Figure 1.3: An extended type space with belief invariant extra signals to
both players
equilibrium of the cheap talk game without extension to the type space, in
the following equilibrium meaningful information transmission does occur.
An Equilibrium: The speaker sends message nw when he observes that
the state of the world is nc, and when he also receives the additional signal
1. Otherwise, the speaker sends the message w 6= nw. The listener, when
observing message nw, understands that the state of the world is nc and
therefore she maintains the status quo (action sq). If the listener observes
message w, and receives the additional signal `, she fires the manager (action
f), whereas, if she observes message w and her own additional signal is r,
then she will provide additional support to the manager (action supp).
Define an equilibrium outcome of an incomplete information game as a
function that maps each realization of the state of the world to a probability
distribution on the set of actions. The above equilibrium induces an equi-
librium outcome as described in Figure 4. In contrast, in any cheap talk
equilibrium without extra signals for players, the listener’s action is always
be supp because there could be no communication.
Intuitively, in this equilibrium, diverse beliefs about the speaker’s messag-
ing strategy and the meaning of the message w induce meaningful information
transmission. Interpret the message w as the warning, “there might be a cri-
7
sq f supp
nc 1/2 1/6 1/3
c 0 1/2 1/2
Figure 1.4: An equilibrium outcome of given game: Θ→ ∆A
sis”, because it is sent in both states nc (no crisis) or c (crisis). Interpret nw
as no warning (i.e, “there is no crisis”) because it is sent only in the state nc
(no crises). Although there is no uncertainty about the meaning of nw (no
warning), the message w (warning) is intended and interpreted differently
by players with different extra signals. Listener type ` takes this warning w
seriously with the updated belief on Θ as (1/3, 2/3) after observing message
w, and she optimally responds to w by firing the manager. On the other
hand, the listener type r with updated belief (1/2,1/2) after w, considers the
warning more lightly, and she optimally chooses to provide more support to
the manager. Note that listener types ` and r share the same belief hierarchy
about Θ, so that they are redundant types. However, they choose different
action strategies because they have different beliefs about the joint space of
Θ and speaker’s messaging strategies.
Then check speaker types’ incentives on the suggested equilibrium. Speaker
type nc, 1 says there is no crisis by nw because he believes that if he sends
a warning with message w, the listener will be more likely to panic (be-
ing type `) and fire him.6 In contrast, speaker type nc, 2 sends a warning
through message w because he anticipates that, given w, the listener is more
likely to doubt the warning (being type r) and respond with moderate ac-
6Note that speaker type nc, 1 believes that the listener is more likely to be type `. That
is, nc, 1 type believes that it is more likely that the listener believes that the state of the
world is probably c given message w, and so chooses f when she received the message w.
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tion supp, which is the speaker’s preference. Like speaker type nc, 2, speaker
type c, 3 sends a warning by the message w with similar incentives. Note
that speaker types nc, 1 and nc, 2 share the same belief hierarchy about Θ,
so that they are redundant types. However, they choose different messaging
strategies because they have different beliefs about the joint space of Θ and
listener’s action strategies. Also note that speaker types’ beliefs about the
joint space of Θ and listener’s action strategies come from the speaker types’
beliefs about the listener types’ beliefs about the speaker types’ messaging
strategies.
In sum, I introduce a mediator who gives out extra signals that depend
on the state θ ∈ Θ, but the extra signals do not give additional information
about Θ to players. Introducing belief invariant extra signals create new
equilibrium with meaningful communication. Those extra signals represent
the players’ uncertainties about Θ and each other’s strategies (by represent-
ing listener’s beliefs about speaker’s messaging strategy and speaker’s belief
about listener action strategies given messages) on the suggested equilibrium.
Therefore, the mediator and additional signals do not constitute a real me-
diator that send out actual signals that players observe; instead, they are
modeling devices that represent players’ beliefs about Θ and each other’s
strategies. Also, we can see that the extra signals, which represent players’
beliefs about Θ and players’ strategies, must not give additional informa-
tion about Θ to players. Thus, the belief invariance condition seems to be a
natural requirement for cheap talk games.
The belief invariant extra signal structure is introduced by Liu (2015)
when he defined belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium for simultaneous-
move incomplete information games,7 which is one of many possible corre-
7Liu (2015) called his new equilibrium the correlated equilibrium for incomplete infor-
mation games. To avoid confusion with other correlated equilibrium definitions, I follow
Bergemann and Morris (2015) and call Liu’s definition the belief invariant Bayes correlated
9
lated equilibrium definitions for simultaneous move incomplete information
games.8 My research applies extra signal structures with belief invariance to
2-stage games in which incomplete information games are preceded by com-
munication opportunities: communication games. Detailed discussions and
comparisons with Liu’s (2015) equilibrium concept, as well as other equilib-
rium concepts, are provided in section 5.
Note that I could have applied extra signals with different characteristics
to the suggested cheap talk game. That is, different assumptions regarding
the correlation between the original and the extra signals could generate
different types of extra signal structure for a cheap talk game. The intuitive
reason of choosing extra signals that are possibly correlated to Θ with belief
invariance for cheap talk games is explained above: extra signals represent
players’ beliefs about Θ and other players’ strategies, so that they must not
give more information about Θ. I provide formal justification of the belief
invariant extra signal structure for cheap talk games in the epistemic analysis
(section 3 and 4).
In the real world, uncertainties about the meanings of transmitted mes-
sages are prevalent and diverse beliefs about messaging strategies do matter
in strategic situations with communication. Informative messages are coded
to allow diverse interpretations, sometimes intentionally, or their meanings
can be open to interpretation because of the limits of the language. Examples
of informative messages with possibly diverse interpretations include firms’
business plans and financial statements, rumors in the financial markets,
credit ratings published by credit rating agencies, pledge made by political
equilibrium.
8In Aumann’s (1987) definition of the correlated equilibrium for complete information
games, players are allowed to observe additional signals before choosing actions. For
incomplete information games, one can define various correlated equilibrium concepts that
depend on the relationship between original uncertainty and extra signals. The original
and extra signals could be independent, arbitrarily correlated, or have the belief invariance
in the middle of the two extremes.
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candidates, and oil reserve estimations by firms and governments.
Generalizing the example
In this paper, I generalize in several ways intuitions from the example
described above. First, I define correlated cheap talk equilibrium for
general multi-player incomplete information games. I define cheap talk as a
simultaneous one-shot public message exchange that transpires before play-
ers choose actions. A correlated cheap talk equilibrium is a version of the
correlated equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of an incomplete information
game, wherein players observe belief invariant extra signals before exchanging
cheap talk messages and choosing actions.
I provide epistemic justification for the correlated cheap talk equilibrium.
The epistemic analysis shows that the correlated cheap talk equilibrium is
the proper equilibrium concept for incomplete information games preceded
by cheap talk communication opportunities. Some solution concepts have
been justified by epistemic analysis. For example, Aumann (1987) provides
a rationale for correlated equilibrium with complete information games. He
shows that assumptions of the common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality
of players with a common prior imply correlated equilibrium outcomes in a
given complete information games. I conduct the same analysis for incom-
plete information games that are preceded by a cheap talk communication
opportunity. Proposition 1 states that the correlated cheap talk equilibrium
represents the common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with
a common prior in a given cheap talk game. Therefore, we should consider
the correlated cheap talk equilibrium if we wish to understand the reason-
able equilibrium expectations of a given incomplete information game that
are preceded by a possible cheap talk communication opportunity.
The epistemic analysis for the correlated cheap talk equilibrium also tells
us how to interpret extra signals and belief invariance in the definition of
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the correlated cheap talk equilibrium. Extra signals represent players’ beliefs
about the state of the world and players’ strategies. The belief invariance of
extra signals translates into an important informational assumption of games
with cheap talk communication opportunities as follows: players’ informa-
tion about Θ comes only from their original information about Θ prior to
communication and from transmitted messages regarding cheap talk commu-
nication.
Next, all previous intuitions are applied to general mediated communi-
cation. Moving away from one-shot simultaneous communication, Forges
(1986, 1990, 2006) has defined communication equilibrium for incomplete
information games. Her objective is to characterize equilibrium outcomes
of incomplete information games that are preceded by arbitrary communi-
cation protocols. A communication game is a 2-stage extensive form game
in which a mediator invites players to report their types, then gives out ac-
tion recommendations to players according to predetermined rules. Forges
(1990) shows that such mediated communication can represent any possi-
ble communication protocol before an incomplete information game, and she
identifies a communication equilibrium of an incomplete information game
as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of a given
game. Note that the communication equilibrium does not incorporate and
explain players’ uncertainties about each others’ messaging strategies because
it is defined to be the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a given communica-
tion game. That is, the equilibrium suggested in the motivating example
is not a communication equilibrium of suggested game. Therefore, I de-
fine correlated communication equilibrium for multi-player incomplete
information games by adding belief invariant extra signals prior to the ini-
tiation of mediated communication. An epistemic justification of correlated
communication equilibrium shows that the new equilibrium represents com-
mon knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common prior
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given a communication extension of an incomplete information game. Ex-
tra signals represent players’ beliefs about Θ and all players’ communication
and action strategies. Belief invariance represents the fact that players’ in-
formation about Θ comes only from original information acquired prior to
communication and from communication outputs.
Related literature
Crawford and Sobel (1982) suggest the cheap talk equilibrium as proper
solution concept of cheap talk games. Forges (1986, 1990, 2006) general-
izes cheap talk communication to general communication protocols, and she
suggests the communication equilibrium as a proper solution concept of com-
munication games. New solution concepts suggested in this paper replace ex-
isting equilibrium definitions for cheap talk games, or communication games.
Aumann (1974, 1987) defines the correlated equilibrium for complete in-
formation games, and he provides epistemic justification of it. I extend Au-
mann (1974)’s logic to 2-stage games in which incomplete information games
are preceded by communication stages, define correlated cheap talk and cor-
related communication equilibrium, and provide epistemic justifications of
the new definitions.
Lipman (2009) asks how vague communication can be formally modeled
so that the meanings of vague messages such as “tall” or “short” are not
precisely defined and used. I answer Lipman’s question by showing that
the vagueness of communication can be a product of players’ uncertainties
about other players’ messaging strategies, and I suggest forms of correlated
equilibrium of communication games to represent such uncertainties.
In the motivating example, I considered a special form of 2-player cheap
talk game, in which the speaker’s utility does not depend on the state of the
world. Glazer and Rubinstein (2012) call such games “persuasion games.”
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They assume that players are bounded rational in order to have equilibria
with meaningful communication in persuasion games. In contrast, I assume
full rationality of players. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) assume that the
speaker can choose extra signals with commitment before his original signals
are realized, and they study the speaker’s problem of choosing an optimal
signal structure. They examine an example of a persuasion game in which
meaningful communication is possible under a given commitment assump-
tion. In contrast, I suggest new equilibrium concepts without any com-
mitment assumption, and this provides better equilibrium predictions than
existing theories do.
Ishida and Shimizu (2012) and Barreda (2013) consider 2-player cheap
talk games in which the listener has access to private information about
Θ, and they show that providing more private information to the listener
can reduce information transmission incentives in cheap talk equilibria. In
contrast, I consider general multi-player incomplete information games that
are extended by extra signals with belief invariance.
The new equilibrium definitions presented in this paper can also be in-
terpreted as new correlated equilibrium definitions for simultaneous move
incomplete information games. The literature on various correlated equilib-
rium definitions for incomplete information games is closely related to the
work presented here. Forges (1986, 2006) suggests various correlated equilib-
rium definitions for incomplete information games, as well as Bergemann and
Morris (2013, 2015) and Liu (2015). Detailed discussions and comparisons
are provided in section 5.
Ely and Pesky (2006), Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007), and Liu
(2015) discuss meanings and roles of redundant types in type spaces for
incomplete information games. I discuss meanings of redundant types for
communication games.
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Several authors, including Asheim and Perea (2005) and Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (1999, 2002, 2007) provide various epistemic analyses of extensive
games for rationalizability notions. In contrast, I conduct epistemic anal-
ysis for equilibrium definitions of limited class of extensive games with the
common prior assumption, in which cheap talk or mediated communication
opportunities precede simultaneous move incomplete information games.
Lambie-Hanson and Parameswaran (2015) study a model of vague com-
munication, in which 2 players, a speaker and a listener, have an identical
preference and there is an uncertainty about the listener’s rationality. My
model considers multi-player incomplete information games with full ratio-
nality of all players.
Outline of the paper
In section 2, I give the basic setting and notations. In section 3, I de-
fine the correlated cheap talk equilibrium with epistemic justification, and I
discuss the meanings of extra signals and belief invariance. In section 4, I
define the correlated communication equilibrium with epistemic justification.
In section 5, I compare new definitions to existing correlated equilibrium def-
initions. Section 6 presents several properties of new definitions, and section
7 provides more examples. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of future
research topics.
1.2 Setting and Notation
In this section, I describe the setting and notations used throughout the pa-
per. An incomplete information game G ≡ (I,Θ, (Ti)i∈I , p, f, (Ai)i∈I , (ui)i∈I)
consists of the following elements:
• A finite set of players I ≡ {1, 2, . . . , I}.
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• A finite set of payoff-relevant states of the world Θ.
• Finite sets of types Ti for each i ∈ I, and a common prior p ∈ ∆T ,
where T ≡∏i∈I Ti.
• A function f : T → Θ.9
• Finite sets of actions Ai for each i ∈ I.
• Utility functions ui : Θ× A→ R for each i ∈ I.
Thus, the basic setting of this paper describes a finite multi-player si-
multaneous move incomplete information game G. In this game all players
have private information, and players’ beliefs are derived from a common
prior. I extend G by a cheap talk in section 3 and by general communication
protocol in section 4 in order to define a 2-stage cheap talk extension, or a
communication extension of G.
The following notations are used throughout the paper. For any player
i-specific sets or functions Xi, i ∈ I, denote X ≡
∏
i∈I Xi, and X−i ≡∏
j∈I,j 6=iXj. For any set X, ∆X denotes the set of probability measures
over X. prob(.) is the probability calculated by priors and Bayes’ rule.
1.3 Correlated Cheap Talk Equilibrium
In this section, I define a version of a correlated equilibrium of cheap talk
extensions of incomplete information games, and call it the correlated cheap
9Given that player types t ∈ T completely determine the payoff-relevant state of the
world θ ∈ Θ, the join feasibility condition as explained in Bergemann and Morris (2015)
is satisfied in any equilibrium definition with this setting. That is, play can only depend
on joint information from all players. This assumption simplifies my analysis without loss
of generality because I only consider possible equilibria after communication. Note that
any player’s information about basic uncertainty, Θ, after any possible communication is
limited to what is determined by all players’ information, t ∈ T .
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talk equilibrium. The new definition generalizes the intuition observed by the
motivating example. That is, for cheap talk extensions of incomplete infor-
mation games, studying the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, or the sequential
equilibrium, excludes some plausible outcomes of cheap talk games from the
set of equilibrium outcomes because the uncertainties about other players’
strategies are not captured. Thus, we need to study a form of correlated equi-
librium of cheap talk games. Given a multi-player incomplete information
game G, players observe belief invariant extra signals and then they have an
opportunity to simultaneously transmit publicly observable messages before
choosing actions. After formally defining the correlated cheap talk equilib-
rium, I provide an epistemic justification for the new definition, and I explain
the meanings and significance of extra signals and belief invariance.
Define a decision rule to be a function σ : T → ∆A. I define a correlated
cheap talk equilibrium outcome of a game G as a decision rule σ which is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of an extended game of G. The game
G is extended by belief invariant extra signals to players and a cheap talk
opportunity. Extra signals to players are represented by a correlating device.
Definition 1. A correlating device for G is defined to be Γ ≡ ((Ci)i∈I , (qt)t∈T )
such that
• Ci are finite sets for all i ∈ I.
• qt ∈ ∆C for all t ∈ T
• prob(θ|ti, ci) = prob(θ|ti) for any θ ∈ Θ, ti ∈ Ti, ci ∈ Ci, and i ∈ I.
A correlating device defines sets of extra signals (Ci)i∈I and a common
prior qt over C, for each realized t ∈ T . The third condition, which in the
literature is called “belief invariance,” says that players’ beliefs on Θ do not
change when they observe extra signals (ci ∈ Ci)i∈I .
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A correlating device Γ and sets of finite messages (Mi)i∈I with an incom-
plete information game G describe the following 2-stage game. First, nature
chooses (ti ∈ Ti)i∈I according to p, and θ ∈ Θ is determined by t ∈ T and
f . Then there is an impartial mediator who is represented by a correlating
device Γ. The mediator knows the realized t ∈ T and he sends out extra sig-
nals (ci ∈ Ci)i∈I to players according to qt ∈ ∆C.10 Note that the mediator
sends out extra signals such that players do not update their beliefs about Θ
when they observe extra signals. In stage 1, players simultaneously choose
and publicly reveal messages (mi)i∈I from finite sets (Mi)i∈I . In stage 2, af-
ter observing all signals m ∈ M , players choose (ai ∈ Ai)i∈I simultaneously.
Then I define the correlated cheap talk equilibrium as follows.
Definition 2. A decision rule σ : T → ∆A is a correlated cheap talk equi-
librium outcome of an incomplete information game G if
1. There exists a correlating device Γ and finite sets of messages (Mi)i∈I .
2. There exists player i’s messaging strategy m¯i : Ti×Ci →Mi, and action
strategy a¯i : Ti × Ci ×M → Ai, for all i ∈ I.
3. Players’ strategy profiles (a¯i, m¯i)i∈I and their beliefs constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of described 2-stage game.11
10When I define the correlated cheap talk equilibrium, I let players receive extra sig-
nals by an impartial mediator, which follow Aumann’s (1974) definition of the correlated
equilibrium of complete information games by extra signals. Later, with the epistemic
justification of the correlated cheap talk equilibrium, I show that extra signals represent
players’ beliefs about the state of the world Θ and other players’ strategies. The impartial
mediator is just a modeling device to represent players’ beliefs. The epistemic interpreta-
tions of mediators and extra signals closely follow and extend Aumann’s (1987) work on
the correlated equilibria of complete information games, in which he explains that extra
signals in correlated equilibria represent players’ beliefs about each other’s chosen actions.
11As I don’t restrict T or C to have full support, some of correlated cheap talk equilibria
could be rendered invalid when there are probability zero events and when equilibrium
entails irrational behavior on such events. In such cases, one might want to apply equi-
librium refinement in light of the sequential equilibrium. However, the correlated cheap
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4. σ is induced by p,Γ, and (a¯i, m¯i)i∈I .
The set of correlated cheap talk equilibrium outcomes of G is the union of
all possible correlated cheap talk equilibrium outcomes of G, with all possible
Γ and (Mi)i∈I .
Example revisited: A decision rule associated with the game given in the
motivating example is provided in Figure 4, which cannot be realized by any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the cheap talk game with the original type
space, Θ. Also, the extra signal structure given by Figures 1 and 2 is a corre-
lating device for the game in the motivating example. Note that the decision
rule depicted in Figure 4 is a correlated cheap talk equilibrium outcome of
the given game. For such correlated cheap talk equilibrium, the correlating
device is given by Figures 1 and 2 and equilibrium strategies are described in
the motivating example.
Note that a correlated cheap talk equilibrium is a version of a correlated
equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of G because players observe extra
signals before playing a 2-stage cheap talk game. On the other hand, if we
interpret the cheap talk communication as a source of correlation for G, the
correlated cheap talk equilibrium could also be interpreted as a version of a
correlated equilibrium for given simultaneous move incomplete information
game G.
Providing belief invariant extra signals to players prior to cheap talk
games is not the only way to define a correlated equilibrium of cheap talk
games. One can introduce different correlated equilibria by allowing different
talk equilibrium in this paper is defined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a 2-stage
cheap talk game with extra signals for the sake of simplicity and for similarity with widely
understood cheap talk equilibrium. Note that Gerardi and Myerson (2007) defined the
strong sequential communication equilibrium for communication games, in order to con-
duct equilibrium refinement of the communication equilibrium. By combining correlated
version of cheap talk equilibrium and sequential equilibrium refinement, one might define
“strong sequential correlated cheap talk equilibrium” for incomplete information games.
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degrees of correlation between extra signals and original signals. I justify my
choice of the specific form of correlated equilibrium with epistemic analysis.
Epistemic foundation of the correlated cheap talk equilibrium12
I extend Aumann’s (1987) work to provide epistemic justification of cor-
related cheap talk equilibrium. The epistemic analysis of correlated cheap
talk equilibrium shows that the new solution concept represents common
knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common prior given
a 2-stage cheap talk game. Therefore, if a modeler knows an incomplete
information game G, and a modeler knows the fact that players can engage
in cheap talk before G with a common prior, then the correlated cheap talk
equilibrium must be regarded as the appropriate solution concept. Moreover,
epistemic analysis shows that the extra signals in the definition of the corre-
lated cheap talk equilibrium represent players’ beliefs and information about
the state of the world, Θ and all chosen messaging and action strategies by
players. Therefore, the mediator who gives out extra signals to players is
just a modeling device to represent players’ relevant beliefs in cheap talk
games. In addition, the belief invariance of extra signals represents the fact
that in cheap talk games, players’ information about Θ comes only from their
original signals ((ti ∈ Ti)i∈I) and from transmitted messages (m ∈M).
Aumann (1987) applied the Bayesian approach to game theory, so that
players are assumed to maximize their expected utilities given their informa-
tion and beliefs about exogenous uncertainties (uncertainties about Θ) and
12The epistemic analysis of the correlated cheap talk equilibrium is an adaptation of
Auman’s (1987) epistemic analysis of complete information simultaneous move games to
2 stage cheap talk extensions of incomplete information games. Note that Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (1997) defined the conditional probability system and the epistemic type space
for general extensive form games, and their construction could have applied to 2-stage
cheap talk games for epistemic characterization of correlated cheap talk equilibrium. In-
stead, I choose to define an epistemic type space by following and extending Aumann’s
(1987) analysis, and my approach is simpler and more appropriate for simple 2-stage cheap
talk games and provides a clearer explanation of the main points.
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endogenous uncertainties (uncertainties about other players’ chosen strate-
gies). The Bayesian approach is different from the traditional approach to
game theory, in which probabilities are assigned to exogenous uncertainties
only. Applying the Bayesian approach to complete information simultaneous
move games, Aumann (1987) defined common prior epistemic type spaces for
complete information games. A state in an epistemic type space describes
both exogenous uncertainties (realized θ ∈ Θ, which is trivial in the case
of complete information games) and endogenous uncertainties (all players’
chosen strategies).
Then Aumann (1987) showed that if in complete information games play-
ers are rational in all states of a given epistemic type space (which implies
common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players), then the distribu-
tion of actions is a correlated equilibrium distribution. Note that a correlated
equilibrium for a complete information game is defined by extra signals to
players and players’ equilibrium strategies that depend on extra signals. Au-
mann’s (1987) epistemic analysis shows, first, that the correlated equilibrium
represents the common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with
a common prior given a complete information game, and second, that ex-
tra signals in the definition of the correlated equilibrium represent players’
beliefs about other players’ chosen strategies (endogenous uncertainties).
I generalize Aumann’s (1987) analysis of complete information simulta-
neous move games to 2-stage incomplete information cheap talk games. Con-
sider a 2 stage game, which is a cheap talk extension GC of an incomplete
information game G. In the first stage of GC , all players simultaneously
send publicly observable messages from finite sets of messages (Mi)i∈I . In
the second stage of GC , players simultaneously choose actions defined in G.
Note that in the definition of GC , there does not exist a mediator who gives
out some extra signals. I define a common prior epistemic type space Ω of
GC . As in Aumann (1987), an epistemic state ω ∈ Ω represents not only ex-
21
ogenous uncertainties (θ ∈ Θ and t ∈ T ) but also endogenous uncertainties
(players’ chosen messaging and action strategies). With an epistemic type
space, players are assumed, first, to take both exogenous and endogenous
uncertainties alike and, second, rationally choose optimal messages and ac-
tions based on their beliefs on all possible uncertainties. A common prior
epistemic type space Ω for a cheap talk extension GC of G consists of the
following:
• A finite set of states of the world Ω and a common prior pˆ ∈ ∆Ω.
• Functions that specify exogenous uncertainties for states, tˆ : Ω→ T, θˆ :
Ω → Θ. By definition, θˆ ≡ f ◦ tˆ, and pˆ together with tˆ must be
congruent to p.
• Functions that specify players’ chosen messaging strategies for states,
mˆi : Ω→Mi for all i ∈ I.
• Functions that specify players’ chosen action strategies for states, AˆMi :
Ω→ AMi for all i ∈ I. Here, AMi is the space of all functions from M
to Ai, with a typical element A
M
i : M → Ai. 13
• Each player i’s information partition PAii on Ω when he chooses AMi ∈
AMi for all i ∈ I, such that player i knows his type ti ∈ Ti, his messaging
strategy mi ∈ Mi, his action strategy AMi ∈ AMi , and the transmit-
ted public message m ∈ M . In other words, tˆi, mˆi, AˆMi , and mˆ are
measurable with respect to PAii for all i ∈ I.
• Each player i’s information partition PMii on Ω when he chooses mi ∈
Mi for all i ∈ I, such that player i knows his type ti ∈ Ti, his messaging
13Player i’s action strategy given ω ∈ Ω is defined to be a function that maps the set
of realized messages M to the set of player i’s actions Ai, due to the structure of 2-stage
game GC . Therefore, a state ω ∈ Ω contains information about player i’s action choice in
the hypothetical situation if player i received a different message combination other than
what he actually receives in ω.
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strategy mi ∈ Mi, and his action strategy AMi ∈ AMi , but does not
know the message combination that will be sent from other players,
m−i ∈ M−i. In other words, PMii is a coarser partition than PAii , and
each element of PMii is obtained by merging elements of P
Ai
i which
share same tˆi, mˆi, and AˆMi .
14
• Player i’s belief about Θ is affected only by his information about ti,
and by information observed by public messages m ∈ M . In other
words, information about θ is only updated by communication. Take
any two pi, p
′
i ∈ PMii such that they share same ti, then we have
pˆ(θ|pi) = pˆ(θ|p′i) (1.1)
for any θ ∈ Θ.
The last condition in the above definition of the epistemic type space
is the main informational assumption of GC : players’ information about Θ
comes only from either their original signals or from communication outputs.
In the epistemic type space, player i’s partition PAii describes his knowledge
about ti, mi, A
M
i , and m−i, and his belief about Θ. His belief about Θ could
possibly be different from what he believed without information m−i. The
last condition says that the updated belief about Θ comes solely from his
knowledge about m−i. With the coarser information partition P
Mi
i , which is
acquired by forgetting player i’s knowledge about m−i from P
Ai
i , the player
i’s belief about Θ is determined by his knowledge of ti.
Example revisited: An epistemic type space that describes realized θ ∈ Θ
and the players’ chosen strategies for the motivating example is illustrated in
Figure 5. For example, the top left state describes the state of the world (nc),
14Note that player i’s action strategy is a function that maps the set of message com-
binations to his actions, and it is decided before he receives realized messages. Therefore,
player i’s action strategy is decided when his beliefs and information are given by PMii .
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together with the speaker’s messaging strategy (nw) and the listener’s action
strategy (sq, f), so that the listener chooses (sq) when she received message
(w), and she chooses (f) when she receives message (w). Note that the
epistemic type space looks similar to the extended type space given by Figure
3, but there is no extra signal in the epistemic type space. The information
partitions of players are congruent with the information that players hold
when they choose messages or actions. Even if the listener does not send
messages and the speaker does not choose actions in the example, we can
naturally define 2 information partitions for both players. For example, PMLL
consists of two elements that are two columns of the epistemic type space,
whereas PALL consists of four elements: the top left state; the top right state;
the set of the middle left and the bottom left state; and the set of the middle
right and the bottom right state. On the other hand, PMSS and P
AS
S consist
of three elements that are three rows of the type space.
sq, f sq, supp
nc, nw 0.2 0.1
nc, w 0.1 0.2
c, w 0.2 0.2
Figure 1.5: An epistemic type space Ω of the game in the example.
Then I suggest epistemic justification of the correlated cheap talk equi-
librium as follows.
Proposition 1. A decision rule σ : T → ∆A is a correlated cheap talk
equilibrium outcome of G if and only if there exists a common prior epistemic
type space Ω of GC with sets of messages (Mi)i∈I , such that the followings
conditions are satisfied.
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• σ is induced by Ω.
• Each player i is Bayes rational at each state of the world in choosing
mi ∈Mi given information PMii .
• Each player i is Bayes rational at each state of the world in choosing
AMi ∈ AMi given information PAii .15
Proof. For the “if” direction, assume that there is an epistemic type space
Ω of GC with described conditions. I construct a correlated cheap talk equi-
librium of G by sets of messages, a correlating device, and the equilibrium
strategies of players. Take (Mi)i∈I as given by GC . Define
Ci ≡ PMii (1.2)
Therefore, an extra signal for player i, ci ∈ Ci, determines player i’s
information tˆi, and strategies mˆi and AˆMi . Also, define




Denote for all c ∈ C, c = ⋂
i∈I
ci ≡ (c1, c2, . . . , cI). Note that a fixed c ∈ C
exhausts all possible uncertainties in Ω, and so any c ∈ C is a singleton set,
and we can define an 1-1, onto function f˜ : C → Ω. For all t ∈ T and all
c ∈ C, define
qt(c) ≡ pˆ(f˜(c))
pˆ(ω ∈ Ω|tˆ(ω) = t) (1.4)




15As noted in Aumann (1987), if all players are rational in every states of the epistemic
type space for choosing all strategies, then the rationality of players is common knowledge.
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prob(θ|ti, ci) = pˆ(θ|f˜(ci)) = pˆ(θ|f˜(c′i)) = prob(θ|ti, c′i) (1.5)
, by the definition of p, q, and the condition (1.1). Therefore, we know
that defined Γ ≡ ((Ci)i∈I , (qt)t∈T ) is a correlating device for G. Now I define
players’ equilibrium strategies. For all ti ∈ Ti, ci ∈ Ci with tˆ(f˜(ci)) = ti and
all i ∈ I,
m¯i(ti, ci) ≡ mˆi(f˜(ci)) (1.6)
Also, for all ti ∈ Ti, ci ∈ Ci,m ∈ M with tˆ(f˜(ci)) = ti, and all i ∈ I,
define
a¯i(ti, ci,m) ≡ AˆMi (f˜(ci))(m) (1.7)
The above strategies m¯i and a¯i for all i ∈ I constitute a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in the extended cheap talk game of G, which is extended by the
correlating device Γ and sets of messages (Mi)i∈I . First, m¯i(ti, ci) = mˆi(f˜(ci))
maximizes player i’s expected utility since he is Bayes rational in choosing
mi ∈ Mi when he has information f˜(ci). Also, a¯i(ti, ci,m) ≡ AˆMi (f˜(ci))(m)
maximizes player i’s expected utility because the knowledge of f˜(ci) ∈ PMii
and m ∈ M determines a member pAi ∈ PAii , and player i is Bayes rational
in choosing AMi ∈ AMi with information pAi ∈ PAii .
For the “only if” direction, let σ be a correlated cheap talk equilibrium
outcome with given Γ and (Mi)i∈I . Define an epistemic type space Ω such
that each ω ∈ Ω describes tˆ, mˆi, AˆMi for all i as given by game G, correlating
device Γ, and the equilibrium strategies of players. Assign pˆ(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
as derived from p, q, and players’ equilibrium strategies. Check that the
properties listed in Proposition 1 are satisfied.
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Example revisited: Note that in the epistemic type space described by
Figure 5, players are rational in choosing messaging and action strategies
given their information partitions. Therefore, the decision rule induced by
the epistemic type space is a correlated cheap talk equilibrium, according to
Proposition 1. We can see that the described equilibrium in the motivating
example with Γ(Figures 1 and 2), generates the equilibrium outcome described
in Figure 4. This, in turn, is induced by the epistemic type space described
by Figure 5.
Interpretations of extra signals and belief invariance
The epistemic analysis of the correlated cheap talk equilibrium sheds light
on the interpretations and meanings of extra signals and the belief invariance
condition in the definition of the correlated cheap talk equilibrium.
Consider how sets of extra signals are determined in the proof of Propo-
sition 1. When a correlated cheap talk equilibrium is constructed given an
epistemic type space Ω ofGC with rational players, each set Ci is defined to be
the same as PMii , player i’s information partition when he chooses messaging
strategy mi ∈Mi. That is, player i’s extra signal ci ∈ Ci represents his belief
and knowledge about both exogenous uncertainties (uncertainties about Θ),
and endogenous uncertainties (uncertainties about the messaging and action
strategies of other players) when he chooses messaging strategies without
knowing the realized message combination of other players, m−i ∈M−i.16
16In the proof of Proposition 1, player i’s extra signal ci ∈ Ci, which is constructed from
information pMi ∈ PMii , determines player i’s knowledge about ti ∈ Ti, as well as optimal
messaging and action strategies. Note that in the definition of the correlated cheap talk
equilibrium, an extra signal ci of player i does not necessarily determine his original signal
ti and his optimal strategies. However, for every extra signal structure for a correlated
cheap talk equilibrium, we can redefine an outcome equivalent extra signal structure that
contains all information from original signals (outcome equivalence means that there is a
1-1, onto function that maps the original type space, which includes original and extra
signals of players, to the new type space so that the function preserves all types’ beliefs
about Θ and all other players’ strategies in a given equilibrium.) In the proof of Proposition
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In the proof of Proposition 1, the belief invariance of extra signals in the
definition of correlated cheap talk equilibrium is derived from condition (1.1)
in the definition of epistemic type space. Condition (1.1) says that players’
information about Θ comes only from the original signals (Ti)i∈I and from
the communication outcome, m ∈ M . Therefore, the belief invariance of
extra signals for a correlated cheap talk equilibrium comes from the main
informational assumption of a cheap talk extension GC of G.
Example revisited: The speaker’s extra signals for the correlated cheap
talk equilibrium in the motivating example characterize his belief and infor-
mation when he chooses a messaging strategy. For example, the speaker’s
extra signal 1 characterizes his information partition given as the top row in
the epistemic type space given in Figure 5. That information partition de-
termines his beliefs about the listener’s action when she receives message w.
Speaker types with extra signals 1 and 2 have different such beliefs about the
joint space of Θ and the listener’s action strategies. However, speaker types
with extra signals 1 and 2 share same beliefs about Θ because they observe
the same original signal nc. The listener’s extra signals and belief invariance
can be interpreted similarly.
1.4 Correlated Communication Equilibrium
In this section, I generalize the analysis of cheap talk extensions of incom-
plete information games to general communication extensions of incomplete
information games. Suppose we wish to know the set of possible equilibrium
outcomes of an incomplete information game G when an unknown form of
communication is possible. It is well known that a more complicated com-
munication protocol might, in the context of incomplete information games,
1, I let players’ extra signals to determine players original signals and strategies when I
construct a correlated cheap talk equilibrium for a given epistemic type space.
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generate larger set of equilibrium outcomes compared to cheap talk. For ex-
ample, Krishna and Morgan (2004) show that in 2 player games, as studied
by Crawford and Sobel (1982), multi-stage cheap talk might induce strictly
larger set of equilibrium outcomes than one stage cheap talk. One can imag-
ine various communication protocols for multi-player incomplete information
games, such as a communication protocol in which only subset of players
could communicate each other for an extended period. Then given an in-
complete information game G, one might ask the following question: What
is the set of possible equilibrium outcomes of G when G is extended by ar-
bitrary communication protocols?
To answer that question, Forges (1986, 1990, 2009) defines a communica-
tion equilibrium of an incomplete information game G as a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of an extended game in which G is preceded by a communication
device. This communication device asks players to report their types in the
interim stage of the game, and then it send out recommendations of actions
to players according to predetermined functions. According to the revelation
principle, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of any arbitrary commu-
nication extension of G can be replicated by a communication equilibrium of
G when an appropriate communication device is chosen. Whereas messages
from all players are revealed to all other players with cheap talk communica-
tion protocol, a communication device enables information transmissions in
which players could be kept from some portion of information which comes
from other players. In contrast to a situation where all information are re-
vealed to all players, in this case players’ incentive constraints are relaxed,
which could induce a larger set of equilibrium outcomes.
Note that the intuition from the motivating example applies also for gen-
eral communication extensions of incomplete information games. That is,
the equilibrium outcome in Figure 4 is what we can expect from a given
game extended by a communication opportunity. However, it is not a com-
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munication equilibrium outcome of a given game without the extra signals
in the motivating example.
Therefore, to define correlated communication equilibrium for an incom-
plete information game G, I allow players to observe belief invariant extra
signals before they report to a communication device. By epistemic analysis,
I show that the correlated communication equilibrium represents the common
knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common prior given
a communication protocol. The epistemic analysis shows also that extra sig-
nals represent players’ beliefs, and belief invariance indicates that players’
information comes only from the original signal and from communication
outcomes.
Consider a game with incomplete informationG ≡ (I,Θ, (Ti)i∈I , p, f, (Ai, ui)i∈I)
as defined in section 2. For G, I define a correlated communication device.
Definition 3. A correlated communication device is defined to be Γ′ ≡
((Ci)i∈N , (qt)t∈T , γ) such that




2. qt ∈ ∆C for all t ∈ T .
3. prob(θ|ti) = prob(θ|ti, ci), for any θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, ci ∈ Ci.
4. γ : T × C → ∆A.
A correlated communication device Γ′ can be thought of as consisting of
two different types of mediators. First, after the original signals t ∈ T and
the state of the world θ ∈ Θ is realized, there is a mediator who gives out
belief invariant extra signals (ci ∈ Ci)i∈I to players. As noted before, the first
type of mediator is a modeling device that models players’ beliefs about Θ
and other players’ strategies in communication games. Second, after players
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receive original and extra signals, there is a mediator who invites players to
report their original and extra signals, and he provides recommendations of
actions to players according to predetermined rules. As suggested by Forge’s
(1986, 1990, 2006) analysis of communication equilibrium, the second type of
mediator is a modeling device that represents some communication protocol,
which is a rule of communication with a given incomplete information game.
A correlated communication device Γ′ together with an incomplete in-
formation game G describes a 2-stage communication extension of G as the
following. Nature draws t ∈ T and c ∈ C according to p and (qt)t∈T , and
each player i ∈ I observes ti ∈ Ti and ci ∈ Ci. Then there is a communica-
tion device that invites players to report their original and additional signals
((ti, ci) ∈ Ti×Ci)i∈I , and it gives out recommendations to players according
to γ : T × C → ∆A.17 I define the correlated communication equilibrium as
follows.
Definition 4. A decision rule σ : T → ∆A is a correlated communication
equilibrium outcome of an incomplete information game G if
1. There exists a correlated communication device Γ′.
2. Players cannot gain by unilaterally lying about their types or by devi-
ating from recommended actions in the extended game G with Γ′.18
3. σ is induced by p and Γ′.
17The definition of the correlated communication device and the communication ex-
tension of G implicitly assumes the revelation principle. That is, I could have defined
the correlated communication device and a communication extension of G with sets of
messages for players and sets of signals to players from the mediator.
18As in the case of the correlated cheap talk equilibrium, the correlated communication
equilibrium is defined as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, not a sequential equilibrium, of
an extended game, for the sake of simplicity and for similarity with the communication
equilibrium.
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The set of correlated communication equilibrium outcomes of G is the
union of all possible correlated communication equilibrium outcomes of G
that are generated by all possible correlated communication devices which
represent all possible belief invariant extra signal structures and all possible
communication protocols.
Note that the correlated communication equilibrium is a generalization
of the correlated cheap talk equilibrium.
Observation 1. Given an incomplete information game G, a correlated
cheap talk equilibrium outcome σ of G is also a correlated communication
equilibrium outcome of G.
Proof. Given a correlating device Γ and equilibrium strategies for correlated
cheap talk equilibrium, I construct a correlated communication device Γ′.
Take ((Ci)i∈I , (qt)t∈T ) as the same ones provided by Γ; γ is induced by equi-
librium strategies of players in the correlated cheap talk equilibrium. Players’
incentives for messaging and action strategies are satisfied with given corre-
lated cheap talk equilibrium.
The converse of the Observation 1 is not necessarily true: for a given in-
complete information game, there could be correlated communication equi-
librium outcomes which are not correlated cheap talk equilibrium outcomes.19
In section 7, I discuss several examples in which the converse of the Obser-
vation 1 does not hold.
Epistemic foundation of the correlated communication equilib-
rium
In this section, I show that the set of correlated communication equilib-
rium outcomes describe the common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality
19For the game described in the motivating example, the set of correlated cheap talk
equilibrium outcomes is the same as the set of correlated communication equilibrium
outcomes. That is because of the simplicity of the example.
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of players with a common prior given a communication game. First, define
a communication protocol C for an incomplete information game G.
Definition 5. A communication protocol C ≡ {(Mi)i∈I , (Oi)i∈I , β} of an
incomplete information game G consists of the following.
• Finite set Mi, the set of messages for player i for each i ∈ I.
• Finite set Oi, the set of outputs for player i for each i ∈ I.
• A function β : M → ∆O, and derived βi : M → ∆Oi for each i ∈ I.
With a communication protocol C, each player i sends a message mi ∈Mi
to a communication device, and receives an outputs oi ∈ Oi from the commu-
nication device according to βi. Naturally, I define a 2-stage communication
extension GC of an incomplete information game G so that G is preceded by
C. A communication protocol represents a specific communication opportu-
nity that might enable more information transmission than cheap talk.
Now define a common prior epistemic type space Ω of a communication
extension GC of a game G that has the given communication protocol C. A
state ω ∈ Ω describes exogenous uncertainties (θ ∈ Θ, t ∈ T ) and endogenous
uncertainties (players’ chosen messaging and action strategies.) A common
prior epistemic type space Ω of GC describes the following:
• A finite set of states of the world Ω and a common prior pˆ ∈ ∆Ω.
• Functions that specify exogenous uncertainties for states, tˆ : Ω → T ,
and θˆ : Ω → Θ. By definition, θˆ ≡ f ◦ tˆ and pˆ together with tˆ are
congruent to p.
• Functions that specify players’ chosen messaging strategies for states,
mˆi : Ω→Mi for all i ∈ I.
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• Functions that specify players’ received communication outputs for
states, βˆi : Ω → Oi for all i ∈ I. Note that βˆi ≡ βi ◦ mˆ by defini-
tion.
• Functions that specify players’ chosen action strategies for states, AˆOii :
Ω→ AOii for all i ∈ I. Note that AOii is the space of all functions from
the set of communication outputs Oi to the chosen action Ai, with a
typical element AOii : Oi → Ai.20
• Each player i’s information partition PAii on Ω when he chooses AOii ∈
AOii for all i ∈ I, such that player i knows his type ti ∈ Ti, his messaging
strategy mi ∈ Mi, action strategy AOii ∈ AOii , and output from com-
munication βi(m). In other words, tˆi, mˆi, Aˆ
Oi
i , and βˆi are measurable
with respect to PAii .
• Each player i’s information partition PMii on Ω when he chooses mi ∈
Mi for all i ∈ I, such that player i knows his type ti ∈ Ti, his messaging
strategy mi ∈ Mi, and action strategy AOii ∈ AOii , but does not know
output from communication βi(m). In other words, P
Mi
i is a coarser
partition than PAii , and each element of P
Mi
i is obtained by merging
elements of PAii which share the same tˆi, mˆi, and Aˆ
Oi
i .
• Player i’s belief about Θ is affected only by his information about ti
and by information from the communication. Take any two pi, p
′
i ∈ PMii
such that they share the same ti. Then we have
pˆ(θ|pi) = pˆ(θ|p′i) (1.8)
for any θ ∈ Θ.
20Like the epistemic type space for cheap talk games, players’ action strategies are
functions that map the set of communication outputs to the set of actions due to the
structure of 2-stage game GC .
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Then I suggest epistemic justification of the correlated communication
equilibrium as follows.
Proposition 2. A decision rule σ : T → ∆A is a correlated communication
equilibrium outcome of an incomplete information game G if and only if there
exists an epistemic type space Ω of a communication extension GC of G with
a communication protocol C, such that the followings conditions are satisfied.
• σ is induced by Ω.
• Each player i is Bayes rational at each state of the world in choosing
mi ∈Mi with information PMii .
• Each player i is Bayes rational at each state of the world in choosing
AOii ∈ AOii with information PAii .
Proof. Omitted. (Similar to the proof of Proposition 1).
Proposition 2 says that the the set of correlated communication equi-
librium outcomes of a given incomplete information game G represents the
common knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common
prior given GC with a fixed communication protocol C. Therefore, when a
modeler knows (a) the underlying game G and (b) that players might engage
in some form of communication without knowing the exact communication
protocol, the modeler expects the set of correlated communication equilib-
rium outcomes as plausible equilibrium outcomes with a common prior.
Moreover, the definition of the epistemic type space Ω of GC and the proof
of Proposition 2 indicate that the extra signals that players receive in the def-
inition of correlated communication device represent their beliefs regarding
both exogenous and endogenous uncertainties when they choose messaging
strategies. Additionally, the belief invariance of extra signals represents the
main informational assumption of communication extensions of incomplete
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information games - i.e, condition (1.8). Players’ information about Θ comes
only from their information about (ti ∈ Ti)i∈I and from communication out-
puts. I do not discuss this issue in further detail here because it resembles
my discussion about extra signals and belief invariance in section 3.
1.5 Comparisons with Other Equilibrium Def-
initions
So far, I defined new solution concepts, correlated cheap talk equilibrium and
correlated communication equilibrium for incomplete information games that
are preceded by communication opportunities. New definitions represent rea-
sonable predictions of a given incomplete information game G with a common
prior, preceded by a cheap talk opportunity or by a general communication
opportunity. Note that new definitions can be interpreted as correlated equi-
librium definitions of incomplete information games, wherein the correlation
between players’ actions come from players’ correlated beliefs and communi-
cations. In this section, I compare new definitions with existing correlated
equilibrium definitions.
Aumann (1974, 1987) defines correlated equilibrium for complete infor-
mation games. New definitions introduced in this paper are generalizations
of Aumann’s correlated equilibrium as follows:
Observation 2. With complete information, the set of correlated cheap talk
equilibrium outcomes and the set of correlated communication equilibrium
outcomes are the same as the set of correlated equilibrium outcomes.
Proof. Established by definitions.
The new solution concepts presented in this paper generalize Aumann’s
(1974, 1987) correlated equilibrium in two respects. First, they examine equi-
36
libria in incomplete information games. Second, they allow communication
between players. With regarding to equilibrium concepts of incomplete infor-
mation games extended by communication opportunity, Crawford and Sobel
(1982) analyzed the cheap talk equilibrium of incomplete information game
with cheap talk communication opportunities, and Forges (1986, 1990, 2006)
analyzed the communication equilibrium of incomplete information with gen-
eral mediated communication opportunities. The cheap talk equilibrium and
communication equilibrium are perfect Bayesian equilibrium definitions for
2-stage games in which incomplete information games are preceded by com-
munication stages. The correlated cheap talk equilibrium and the corre-
lated communication equilibrium are specific forms of correlated equilibria
for 2-stage incomplete information games with communication, and so they
generalize existing definitions as follows.
Observation 3. For a multi-player incomplete information game G, define a
cheap talk equilibrium as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a 2-stage game in
which a simultaneous public message exchange opportunity precedes G. Then
any cheap talk equilibrium of G is a correlated cheap talk equilibrium. Also, a
communication equilibrium of G is a correlated communication equilibrium.
Proof. Established by definitions.
The correlated cheap talk equilibrium and the correlated communication
equilibrium generalize cheap talk equilibrium and communication equilibrium
by letting players observe belief invariant extra signals before 2-stage com-
munication extensions of incomplete information games. By letting players
observe belief invariant extra signals before simultaneous move incomplete
information games, Liu (2015) defined the belief invariant Bayes correlated
equilibrium. The following observation follows from definitions.
Observation 4. For any incomplete information game G, a belief invariant
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, as defined in Liu (2015), is a correlated cheap
talk equilibrium and also a correlated communication equilibrium.
Proof. Established by definitions.
Note that the set of belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes
describes all possible equilibrium outcomes in which players’ belief hierarchies
over Θ are fixed by their original types, (ti ∈ Ti)i∈I in the description of G.
Also, in the belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium, belief invariance is
introduced in order to study possible equilibrium outcomes in which play-
ers’ beliefs are not changed from what are given by their original types. In
correlated cheap talk equilibrium and the correlated communication equilib-
rium, players’ beliefs about Θ are updated as a result of communications,
and the belief invariance represents the fact that in games with communica-
tion, players’ information about Θ is acquired only from either their original
information, (ti ∈ Ti)i∈I or from communication outputs.
No communication Communication
Complete info Aumann (1987) Aumann (1987)
Incomplete info Liu (2015) Current Paper
Figure 1.6: Correlated equilibrium definitions with belief invariant extra sig-
nals
Figure 6 summarizes my discussion up to this point. It categorizes cor-
related equilibrium definitions, which are defined by belief invariant extra
signals. With complete information games, all possible extra signals are
belief invariant because players do not have private information. In such
cases, allowing a communication opportunity does not affect the set of cor-
related equilibrium outcomes. Any extra signals or communication oppor-
tunity only work to correlated players’ chosen actions, and communication
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does not transmit any information about exogenous uncertainties. There-
fore, Aumann’s (1974, 1987) correlated equilibrium is the relevant equilib-
rium concept of complete information games with and without communica-
tion opportunities. On the other hand, with incomplete information games,
belief invariant extra signals work differently in 2-stage games with commu-
nication than they do in simultaneous move games. Whereas belief invariant
extra signals work only to correlate players’ action strategies in simultaneous
move incomplete information games, they work to correlate players’ commu-
nication and action strategies in 2-stage communication games. Therefore,
extra signals help players to transmit more information about exogenous
uncertainties in 2-stage communication games.
Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2015) define Bayes correlated equilibrium
for incomplete information games by letting players, prior to a given game,
observe arbitrary extra signals given by an omniscient mediator. When con-
sidering the set of the Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes for a given
incomplete information game G, a modeler imagines that players could have
information about Θ beyond what is given by players’ types (ti ∈ Ti)i∈I in
the description of G. Therefore, in the Bayes correlated equilibrium, players’
beliefs about Θ could be arbitrarily updated compared to what are given by
(ti ∈ Ti)i∈I . Extra signals represent additional information structure known
to players, but not to the modeler. In the correlated cheap talk equilibrium
and correlated communication equilibrium outcomes, players’ beliefs about
Θ also can be updated from what is given by (ti ∈ Ti)i∈I . However, in corre-
lated cheap talk and correlated communication equilibrium, a modeler knows
that players’ updated beliefs come from communication. In the new defini-
tions proposed in this paper, extra signals are not the actual information
structure; instead, they represent players’ beliefs about Θ and other players’
strategies in communication games. Also, in this paper, players’ information
about Θ is updated only when the information change is approved by other
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Figure 1.7: Correlated communication equilibrium and other definitions
Figure 7 shows set relations between several different correlated equilib-
rium definitions for incomplete information games. Note that in area A, there
are Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes such that the omniscient mediator
gives out information to players, but some of the information transmission is
not approved by other players. Consequently, such equilibrium outcomes can-
not be realized by games that are extended by belief invariant extra signals
and communication opportunities. In area B, there are correlated communi-
cation equilibrium outcomes as described by the motivating example, so that
such outcomes cannot be a communication equilibrium outcome nor a belief
invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium outcome. The information transmit-
ted to players can only be incentivized by correlated communication: players
need a communication opportunity and they should have uncertainties about
other players’ strategies, which are represented by belief invariant extra sig-
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nals.
Example revisited: Figure 8 shows the set of Bayes correlated equilibrium
(BCE) outcome payoffs and the set of correlated communication equilibrium
(CCE) outcome payoffs of the game G given by the motivating example. Note
that the set of correlated communication equilibrium outcome payoffs is a
proper subset of the set of Bayes correlated equilibrium outcome payoffs. Also,
the set of communication equilibrium outcome payoffs and the set of belief
invariant Bayes correlated outcome payoffs consist of a single point, (7, 2.6).
The equilibrium outcome payoffs described in the motivating example and
Figure 4 is the point (3.7, 3) in Figure 8.:21
(a) Set of BCE outcome payoffs (b) Set of CCE outcome payoffs
Figure 1.8: Comparison of BCE and CCE outcome payoffs of the example
1.6 Several Properties of New Definitions
Several meaningful properties of new definitions can be easily verified.
21The set of BCE and CCE outcomes are numerically calculated and plotted using
MATLAB.
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First, correlated cheap talk and correlated communication equilibrium
outcomes are invariant to adding redundant types to the given type space in
an incomplete information game G. That is, the set of correlated cheap talk
and correlated communication equilibrium outcomes depend only on play-
ers’ belief hierarchies regarding Θ, which are determined by players’ types
(Ti)i∈I in given G.22 This property is shared with Liu’s (2015) belief invari-
ant Bayes correlated equilibrium and Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris’ (2007)
interim correlated rationalizability.
Observation 5. Given an incomplete information game G, the set of cor-
related cheap talk equilibrium outcomes and the correlated communication
equilibrium outcomes are invariant to the addition of redundant types to the
type structure T in G.
Proof. Established by definitions.
Next, we know from Forges (1986) that the set of communication equilib-
rium outcomes is a convex polyhedron because it can be described by linear
inequalities. For a given G, if we fix the correlating device or the correlated
communication device, then the set of correlated cheap talk equilibrium out-
comes and the set of correlated communication equilibrium outcomes are
convex polyhedron because they are described by sets of linear inequalities.
The sets of equilibrium outcomes given G with varying correlating devices or
correlated communication devices are unions of convex polyhedra. I strongly
suspect that the set of correlated cheap talk equilibrium outcomes and the
set of correlated communication equilibrium outcomes are also convex poly-
hedra, as we can observe from Figure 8-(b) for the example. However, I do
not know the general proof of the claim.
22A type space T in an incomplete information game G models players’ belief hierarchies
about Θ, as shown by Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993).
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Forges (1990) justifies her definition of communication equilibrium by
showing that any equilibrium of an extension of G with some form of pre-
play communication (which does not explain the correlated communication
examined in this paper) can be replicated by a communication equilibrium, in
which a communication device receives reports from players about their orig-
inal types (ti ∈ Ti)i∈I , and it sends out action recommendations to players.
The correlated communication device introduced in this paper combines two
types of mediators: a mediator which represent players’ beliefs in communi-
cation games and a mediator which represents a communication protocol as
in Forges (1990). Therefore, a correlated communication device can represent
any pre-play correlated communication (a communication with uncertainties
about players’ strategies) given an incomplete information game as follows.
Observation 6. Let us extend an incomplete information game G with the
following arbitrary communication C¯, thereby define GC¯. Before and after
observing ti ∈ Ti, players are engaged in finite communication stages. At
each stage, players receive extra signals (these do not change their beliefs
about Θ), send messages to a communication device, and receive communi-
cation outcomes from the communication device according to a predetermined
rule. The communication protocol described here includes both ex-ante and
interim communication, and it is the most general form of finite pre-play
communication for a given G. Then any perfect Bayesian equilibrium out-
come of some communication extension GC¯ of G as described above can be
obtained by a correlated communication equilibrium outcome of G.
Proof. Given an incomplete information game G, I show that any equilibrium
outcome of an arbitrary finite communication extension GC¯ as described
above can be replicated in an epistemic type space of GC, which is a 2-
stage game of G extended by some communication protocol C with properties
described in the Proposition 2. Define Ω as the set of final histories of GC¯ .
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For all ω ∈ Ω, define tˆ(ω) and θˆ(ω) given by G, and define mˆi(ω) to be player
i’s reporting strategy in the history ω. Let player i’s information partition
P
Mi
i consist of sets of final histories which share same reporting strategies of
player i. Let information partition PAii to be player i’s information partition
at the final histories. Also, define βˆi(ω) so that it coincides with P
Ai
i . Players’
action strategies AˆOii are defined to coincide with action strategies with given
information βˆi(ω). Check that rationality conditions of players are satisfied
in the constructed epistemic type space.
A large literature23 discusses how to emulate equilibrium outcomes with
mediated communication through some combination of direct communica-
tions. Direct communication, or cheap talk, is the most familiar form of
communication, but the existence of a communication device as a mediator
can seem to be artificial and unnatural. As noted in the literature, various
extended protocols of cheap talk are powerful enough to mimic mediated
talk in most cases: Given that the correlated communication equilibrium
is identical to the communication equilibrium after belief invariant signals
are added, observations from the literature regarding relationships between
mediated and direct communication are applicable to relationships between
correlated communication equilibrium and some extended protocols of cor-
related cheap talk.
Observation 7. In most cases, a correlated communication equilibrium out-
come of game G can be achieved by players who observe belief invariant sig-
23See Forges (1990), Ba´ra´ny (1992), Ben-Porath (2003), Gerardi (2004), Krishna (2007),
and Vida and Forges (2013). Note that Vida and Forges (2013) defines a “correlated cheap
talk” that is different from what is defined in this paper. Vida and Forges (2013) allow
extra signals that are independent to original signals before repeated cheap talk game,
in order to emulate a mediated communication by a repeated cheap talk preceded by
independent extra signals. In contrast, the correlated cheap talk suggested in this paper
allows players to observe extra signals that can be correlated to the original signals with
belief invariance, and extra signals represent players’ beliefs.
44
nals C and then engage in some extended direct communication protocol.
1.7 More Examples
In this section, I consider some additional examples.
General Mediated Communication Compared to Cheap Talk
As explained before, general mediated communication might lead to more
meaningful communication (compared to cheap talk) if some information
were hidden from players, because this would relax the incentive constraints
for truthful reporting.
First, consider a persuasion game similar to the one described in the mo-
tivating example. There are two players, a speaker with private information
about Θ and a listener who chooses an action and has no access to private
information. Suppose that an epistemic type space corresponding to a cor-
related communication equilibrium is given in Figure 9. The row represents
speaker’s information partition PMSS ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The column represents lis-
tener’s information partition PMLL . The small five boxes represent listener’s
information partition PALL . The letters a, b, c, d, e are recommended actions
by the correlated communication device. In Figure 9, some information about
Ω are omitted for the sake of simplicity.
Note that the decision rule induced by suggested correlated communi-
cation equilibrium cannot be implemented by a correlated cheap talk equi-
librium because the amount of information received by the listener depends
on the combination of inputs received from both players. When the listener
is recommended to play b, she cannot differentiate speaker type 3 from 2,
whereas that information is revealed if the listener is recommended to play
c, d, or e. In other words, some information sent by the speaker is selec-






Figure 1.9: An epistemic type space corresponding to a correlated commu-
nication equilibrium
information received by all listener types should be the same. Therefore, in
Figure 9, a decision rule implied by a given epistemic type space cannot be
implemented by a correlated cheap talk equilibrium.
Next, consider a 3 player incomplete information game with I ≡ {1, 2, 3}
and a correlated communication equilibrium as follows. In an epistemic type
space that corresponds to a given correlated communication equilibrium,
player 1’s information partition PA11 contains information about the elements
of PM22 , whereas P
A3
3 does not contain that information. The epistemic type
space models a communication protocol where player 2 gives information to
player 1 but not to player 3. A decision rule induced by a communication
protocol of this type cannot be realized by cheap talk, which is a public
message exchange.
In sum, compared to cheap talk, mediated communication might enable
more communication and more equilibrium outcomes because it does not
reveal all information to all players at the same time.
Correlated Cheap Talk with Persuasion Games
Figure 8-(b) shows that for the given game in the motivating example,
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the correlated communication equilibrium gives strictly larger set of equi-
librium outcomes compared to the communication equilibrium. Then one
might be curious for which incomplete information games G, the correlated
communication makes a difference in equilibrium predictions compared to
the communication equilibrium. Currently I am unaware of general condi-
tions on incomplete information games so that the correlated communication
equilibrium gives strictly larger set of equilibrium outcomes compared to the
communication equilibrium. Instead, I generalize a little from the motivat-
ing example to find sufficient conditions of meaningful communication with
2-player persuasion games.24 Such an exercise might be illustrative and give
us some ideas about when correlated communication makes a difference in
equilibrium predictions.
Consider a persuasion game with 2 players, a speaker, S, and a listener,
L. The speaker learns about the state of the world from a finite set Θ which
is associated with a common prior p; the listener chooses an action from
a finite set A. Assume that the speaker’s utility depends only on A, so
that uS : A → R, and the listener’s utility is given by uL : Θ × A → R.
A generalization of the equilibrium given in the motivating example gives
us sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with meaningful
communication.
Observation 8. A 2 player persuasion game has a correlated cheap talk
equilibrium with meaningful communication if the following conditions are
satisfied.
• There are 3 actions x1, x2, x3 ∈ A
24Note that a 2-player persuasion game is an incomplete information game with a speaker
and a listener. In a persuasion game, the speaker has private information about Θ with-
out choosing an action and the listener chooses an action without private information.
Moreover, the speaker’s utility does not depend on Θ. In any 2-player persuasion game,
all communication equilibrium imply that there is no meaningful communication.
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• There exist b1, b2, b3 ∈ ∆Θ such that given belief bj, the listener’s opti-
mal action is xj for j = 1, 2, 3.
• There exist w1, w2 ∈ [0, 1] such that w1b1 +w2b2 + (1−w1−w2)b3 = p.
• b1 and b2 share same support on Θ.
• The speaker ranks x1, x2, x3 as uS(x1) > uS(x3), uS(x2), without loss of
generality.
• For every θ ∈ Θ which is in the support of b1 and b2,
w1b1(θ)uS(x1) + w2b2(θ)uS(x2) ≥ uS(x3) (1.9)
Proof. One can construct a correlated cheap talk equilibrium of a given per-
suasion game, such as in the epistemic type space described in Figure 10,
with the conditions given in the Observation 8. In the given epistemic type
space, the probability distributions of Θ of the boxes with associated actions
x1 and x2 are given by w1b1 and w2b2 respectively. The distribution of the
left side of the box with action x3 is given by (1 − )(1 − w1 − w2)b3 with
small ; the right side of the box with x3 is given by (1− w1 − w2)b3.
x3
x2 x1
Figure 1.10: An epistemic type space of a correlated cheap talk equilibrium
for a given persuasion game
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Given a 2 player persuasion game, meaningful communication is possible
if the following conditions are satisfied. First, there are 3 actions such that
all 3 actions are listener’s best responses depending on the listener’s belief
about Θ. Second, the listener’s belief about Θ and about the speaker’s
messaging strategies is such that all 3 actions are optimal depending on
received messages. Third, the speaker’s belief about the listener’s action
strategy is such that all speaker types have incentives to send equilibrium
messages. In a sense, the sufficient conditions suggested in Observation 8
show that players’ interests and beliefs are aligned to enable meaningful
communication in a given persuasion game.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I suggest two new equilibrium concepts to represent reasonable
outcomes of 2-stage games, in which simultaneous move incomplete infor-
mation games are preceded by communication opportunities. I suggest the
correlated cheap talk equilibrium for incomplete information games that are
preceded by one-shot public message exchange, and I suggest the correlated
communication equilibrium for incomplete information games that are pre-
ceded by general communication opportunities. New equilibrium concepts
suggested in this paper are generalizations of Aumann’s (1974) correlated
equilibrium for complete information games to 2-stage communication ex-
tensions of incomplete information games.
Following Aumann (1987), I provide epistemic justifications of new defi-
nitions. The correlated cheap talk equilibrium represents the common knowl-
edge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common prior given a cheap
talk game. The correlated communication equilibrium represents the com-
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mon knowledge of the Bayesian rationality of players with a common prior
given a game with a communication protocol. The epistemic analyses show
that the extra signals given in the new definitions are not actual signals ob-
served by players; extra signals are modeling devices that represent players’
beliefs given a communication game. Also, the epistemic analyses show that
belief invariance of extra signals represent the fact that players’ information
comes only from their original information or from communication outputs.
New definitions adopt Liu’s (2015) belief invariant correlating device to
2-stage communication games, whereas Liu (2015) applied correlating de-
vices to simultaneous move games to define belief invariant Bayes correlated
equilibrium. In simultaneous move games, belief invariant extra signals work
to correlate players’ action strategies, and players’ beliefs about the under-
lying states of the world do not change in an equilibrium. In 2-stage com-
munication games, belief invariant extra signals work to correlate players’
messaging and action strategies, and so extra signals enable more informa-
tion transmission about the underlying states of the world in an equilibrium.
Also, new definitions are different from Bergemann and Morris’ (2013, 2015)
Bayes correlated equilibrium so that belief updates of players come only from
communication.
I conclude with several future research possibilities. First, the new equi-
librium definitions suggested in this paper could be used to analyze various
games with communication opportunities. For example, one might apply
equilibrium definitions suggested in this paper to auction theory and to mar-
ket design problems. Suppose that a market designer wants to know the
set of possible equilibrium outcomes of certain forms of auctions - such as
first price or second price auctions - knowing that players might communi-
cate before the auction. The market designer would need to consider the
set of correlated cheap talk equilibrium or the set of correlated communica-
tion equilibrium outcomes depending on communication protocols, instead of
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considering the set of cheap talk equilibrium or communication equilibrium
outcomes.
Second, my idea regarding the uncertainties about message meanings
might be applied to other forms of extensive games in addition to commu-
nication games. For example, one might apply the idea to contract theory.
Consider contract games that are 2-stage games in which players make a
contract in the first period and execute what is agreed on the contract in
the second period. Contract games are different from communication games
because, in contrast to non-binding communication, what is agreed to in the
first stage is binding. In contact games, players’ interpretations of what is
written in a contract can be diverse, which can produce uncertainties and
new equilibria, as in communication games. One might interpret the uncer-
tainty about the interpretation of clauses in contracts as a source of contract
incompleteness. I hope that the intuitions described in this paper improve
understandings of various games and real world phenomena.
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Chapter 2
Common Prior Type Spaces




The notion of a type space is central to the analysis of games with incomplete
information (Harsanyi, 1967-68) and to mechanism design (e.g. Myerson,
1981, Bergemann and Morris, 2005). Types describe agents’ payoff rele-
vant as well as other, payoff irrelevant information, and also agents’ beliefs
about other agents’ types, and agents’ beliefs about other agents’ beliefs, etc.
Bayesian Nash equilibria, or, for example, correlated equilibria of games are
defined with respect to a given type space. Type spaces are flexible modeling
devices that can describe complex belief structures.
Applied game theory often focuses on common prior type spaces in which
56
all information that an agent receives is payoff relevant. If we call the payoff
relevant information of an agent that agent’s “payoff type,” 1 then types and
payoff types are the same for each agent if all information is payoff relevant.
Two special classes with such property have received special attention. One
such class consists of type spaces in which different agents’ types are inde-
pendent (e.g. Myerson 1981). An assumption embedded in this construction
is that agents’ first order beliefs about other agents’ types are the same, irre-
spective of their own type. This implies that agents’ first order beliefs about
other agents’ types are common knowledge among the agents.
A second special class of type spaces that are frequently studied in the
literature are type spaces in which no agent has two distinct types with iden-
tical hierarchies of beliefs. Referring to an agent’s hierarchy of beliefs about
another agents’ types as the agent’s “belief type,” these type spaces are char-
acterized by the property that “belief types determine payoff types.” Implicit
in this construction is the assumption that the function mapping belief types
into payoff types is common knowledge among agents. In mechanism de-
sign these type spaces often allow the construction of mechanisms that elicit
agents’ beliefs about other agents, and by doing so also elicit agents’ payoff
types. Agents then earn no information rents, and the mechanism designer
can “extract the full surplus” (Cre´mer and McLean, 1985, 1988, Neeman,
2004). A recent line of work has examined whether the sets of type spaces
that have the “belief types determine payoff types” property, or that allow
“full surplus extraction,” are generic (Heifetz and Neeman, 2006, Chen and
Xiong, 2011a, 2011b, Gizatulina and Hellwig, 2011).
The polar opposite of the condition that belief types determine payoff
types is the condition that belief types and payoff types are stochastically
independent for every agent, so that knowing the belief type of an agent
1We borrow the expression “payoff type” from Bergemann and Morris (2005).
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does not allow any inferences at all about that agent’s payoff type.2 In
this paper we investigate the class of type spaces for which this opposite
condition, to which we shall refer as the “independence property,” is true.
We are interested in type spaces satisfying this strong condition because an
analysis of games or mechanism design problems for such type spaces allows
the modeler to exclude all effects due to correlation between payoff and belief
types. Moreover, it will turn out that large portions of the existing game
theoretic and mechanism design literature can be re-interpreted as being
concerned with exactly the class of type spaces that satisfy the independence
condition.
We restrict attention to type spaces in which agents’ beliefs are derived
from a common prior. We allow type spaces in which an agent’s type includes
payoff-irrelevant information. Type spaces in which types are independent
obviously have the independence property because in such type spaces all
types of a given agent have the same belief types so that belief types are con-
stant, and constant random variables are stochastically independent of any
other random variable. Our interest is in the question whether there are other
type spaces with the independence property. We answer this question posi-
tively, and we characterize all type spaces with the independence property.
All such type spaces can be interpreted as follows: Agents have indepen-
dent payoff types. They also receive further information that is potentially
not independent among agents, but that is independent of all agents’ payoff
types. Therefore, all types of a given agent have the same belief about other
agents’ payoff types, as is the case in type spaces with independent types,
2Note that the condition that we investigate is in an informal sense the opposite, but
importantly by no means the negation of the “beliefs determine preferences” condition.
The negation encompasses the condition that we study in this paper, but is far more
general. “Environment 2””in Neeman (2004) is an example of a common prior type space
in which one agent’s belief types don’t determine that agent’s payoff types, but in which
this agent’s belief and payoff types are not stochastically independent either.
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but different types of the same agent may hold different beliefs about other
agents’ payoff irrelevant information. Thus, the class of type spaces with the
independence property is a generalization of the class of type spaces with
independent types. A simple, and not surprising, implication of our result
is that common priors for which belief and payoff types are not independent
are generic in the senses considered in the literature on the genericity of the
“beliefs determine preferences” property which we mentioned earlier.3
What is remarkable about our characterization is that we begin with an
independence assumption that refers to each agent separately: each agent’s
payoff type and belief type are independent, and we show that this is equiva-
lent to a form of independence across agents: different agents’ payoff types are
independent, and payoff irrelevant information is independent of all agents’
payoff types. Figuratively speaking, independence propagates from each
agent separately to the group of agents as a whole.
Using the language of the recent literature, type spaces with the indepen-
dence property differ from type spaces with independent types only through
the introduction of “redundant types,” that is, multiple types that have the
same payoff types, and the same hierarchies of beliefs regarding the underly-
ing payoff relevant uncertainty. There is thus a connection between our main
result and Theorems 1 and 2 in Liu (2011), who characterizes for general
common prior type spaces the connection between type spaces with redun-
dant types, and the same type spaces without redundant types. He shows
for common prior type spaces that the type space with redundant type is ob-
tained from the corresponding type space without redundant types by adding
a common prior correlation device where the correlation is conditional on the
vector of agents’ payoff types. Our result shows in a common prior context
that the independence property holds if and only if different players’ payoff
3As this is straightforward to see, but tedious to state formally, we have not included
this observation in the main body of the paper.
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types are independent of each other, and the payoff irrelevant information is
independent of all players’ payoff types.
Our analysis is subtly related to Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).
Seeking an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium, they infer in their
Theorem B from the assumption that beliefs are common knowledge that
beliefs must be product measures. Although their model and their motivation
are entirely different from ours, the proof of our main result includes an
important step that is also included in Aumann and Brandenburger’s proof
of their Theorem B. At the end of Section 3, we shall comment further on
the relation between Aumann and Brandenburger’s result and ours.4
In the last two sections of the paper we describe the implications of our
analysis for game theory and mechanism design. In game theory an ex-
ploration of the Bayesian equilibria of a strategic form game using a type
space with the independence property is equivalent to the exploration of
the “strategic form correlated equilibria” (Cotter, 1991, Forges, 1993) of the
game with the type space in which the payoff irrelevant information is omit-
ted. This result is closely related to Lemma 2 in Liu (2011). However, Liu
studies general type spaces, and therefore his result refers to a more general
version of correlated equilibrium than ours. In his version of correlated equi-
librium, before suggesting strategies to agents, the “mediator” observes the
agents’ types. By contrast, in “strategic form correlated equilibrium” the
“mediator” does not observe agents’ types before recommending strategies.
In mechanism design we show for a wide variety of possible objectives
of the mechanism designer, that mechanisms that are optimal for a type
space with the independence property are essentially the same as the mech-
anisms that are optimal for the corresponding type space in which no payoff
irrelevant information is provided.
4We are very grateful to Qingmin Liu for pointing out the relation between our result
and Aumann and Brandenburger’s result.
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2.2 Framework
There are n ≥ 2 agents. We write N for the set of agents. For each agent
i ∈ N there is a finite set Θi of possible “payoff types” θi of agent i. We bor-
row the expression “payoff type” from Bergemann and Morris (2005), where
payoff types are the possible realizations of a signal that agent i observes,
and whose realizations potentially affect i’s own or other agents’ payoffs in
a game. The payoff type is the only signal that i observes that may affect
payoffs. Agent i may make other observations, but these don’t affect payoffs.
In this and the next section, payoff types are in fact completely abstract. In
these sections it is irrelevant whether there is an underlying game. In Sec-
tions 4 and 5, the interpretation of the elements of Θi as payoff types will,
by contrast, be important. For concreteness, we shall even in Sections 2 and
3 occasionally interpret payoff types as payoff relevant information, and the
reader may have this interpretation in mind throughout.
Throughout the paper, we use notations such as θ ∈ Θ ≡ ∏i∈N Θi, and
θ−i ∈ Θ−i ≡
∏
j 6=i Θj. Also, for any non-empty, finite set X, we denote by
∆(X) the set of all probability distributions on X.
We use type spaces to describe the agents’ beliefs about their own and
others’ payoff types, their beliefs about these beliefs, etc. The modeling
device of type spaces is due to Harsanyi (1967-68). The focus of this paper
is on type spaces with a common prior. The analysis does not apply to type
spaces with subjective priors.To keep our analysis straightforward, we restrict
attention to finite type spaces where the common prior has full support.
Definition 6. A type space is a list ((Ti)i∈N , (θˆi)i∈N , µ) such that:
1. for every i ∈ N , Ti is a non-empty, finite set;
2. for every i ∈ N , θˆi is a function of the form: θˆi : Ti → Θi;
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3. µ ∈ ∆(T ) where T ≡ ∏
i∈N
Ti;
4. µ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ T .
Here, a (standard) implicit assumption is that the type space is common
knowledge, and that each agent i observes her own type ti, but not other
agents’ types t−i.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the range of θˆi is Θi. Writing
µ(t−i|ti) for the conditional probability of t−i where we condition on i’s type
being ti, we define next:
Definition 7. For a given type space ((Ti)i∈N , (θˆi)i∈N , µ), agent i’s belief
function
bˆi : Ti → ∆(T−i) (2.1)
is defined by:
bˆi(ti)(t−i) = µ(t−i|ti) (2.2)
for every ti ∈ Ti, t−i ∈ T−i, i ∈ N .
Thus, bˆi(ti) is the belief about other players’ types that agent i holds if her
type is ti. This belief is derived from the prior µ by conditioning on ti. We
shall refer to bˆi(ti) also as agent i’s “belief type.” We write Bi for the range
of bˆi. Bi is thus the set of all belief types. We shall write µ(θi, bi) for the
probability assigned by µ to the set of all type vectors such that agent i’s
preference is θi and agent i’s belief is bi, and similarly use notation such as
µ(θi), µ(bi), etc.
We make throughout the following assumption which says in words that
there are no “duplicate types:”
Assumption 1. For every i ∈ N , if ti, t′i ∈ Ti and ti 6= t′i, then θˆi(ti) 6= θˆi(t′i)
or bˆi(ti) 6= bˆi(t′i).
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Duplicate types, that we rule out, are thus types with identical payoff types
and with identical beliefs. To apply our main result to type spaces in which
duplicate types exist, one has to successively “merge” duplicate types into a
single type. Assumption 1 means that every type ti is uniquely identified by
ti’s payoff type θˆi(ti) and ti’s belief type bˆi(ti).
Note that Assumption 1 does not rule out what the literature refers to
as “redundant types,” that is, multiple types with identical payoff types
and hierarchies of beliefs about other players’ payoff types. This is because
a players’ type may encode more information than just the player’s payoff
type and the players’ beliefs about other players’ payoff types. This point is
crucial for our paper. The potential importance of redundant types for the
analysis of incomplete information games has been emphasized by Forges
(1993, pp. 284/5). The following discussion of the role of redundant types is
taken from Liu (2009, p. 2117):
“..., if the analyst knows only the payoff structures - he is un-
aware of (or unable to specify) some other variables that the
players know, ... , but he is aware of his unawareness (or mis-
specification) - then a redundant type structure is a “safe” mod-
eling choice: the players “reason” within a redundant structure
as if they were reasoning about some parameters unknown to
the analyst. In other words, the analyst should not make use of
a redundant structure unless he is not sure of the players’ space
of basic uncertainties.”
Liu (2009, 2011) provides formal results that support this interpretation
of redundant types, and that apply to our model. When allowing redundant
types in our model it is Liu’s interpretation that we have in mind, and thus
we allow that the type space is constructed by an analyst who is aware that
he is unaware of some variables that players may have beliefs about.
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The property of type spaces in which we are interested in this paper is
the following:
Definition 8. A type space ((Ti)i∈N , (θˆi)i∈N , µ) has the independence prop-
erty if for every i ∈ N the random variables θˆi and bˆi are independent.
As explained in the Introduction, we view this property as the polar op-
posite of the “beliefs determine payoff types” property. In type spaces with
the independence property, knowing an agent’s beliefs provides no informa-
tion about that agent’s preferences. If a type space has the independence
property with no duplicate types as in Assumption 1, we can relabel the type
space as follows:
Ti = Θi ×Bi for all i ∈ N. (2.3)
The Assumption 1 and the relabeling of type spaces will make our represen-
tations clearer and easier.
2.3 Result
Before stating our result, we give an example that illustrates the result. We
observed already in the Introduction that every naive type space with inde-
pendent types has the independence property trivially because each agent’s
beliefs are constants. Type spaces with independent types, however, embed
a very restrictive common knowledge assumption: each agent’s first order be-
liefs are common knowledge. We therefore give an example in which agents
beliefs about the other agents’ types are not constant, and the agents’ first
order beliefs are not common knowledge.
Example 1. N = {1, 2}. For every i ∈ N , the set of payoff types is Θi =
{θ1i , θ2i }, and the set of types is Ti = {tki : k = 1, 2, 3, 4}. Payoff types are
given by θˆi(t
1
i ) = θˆi(t
2




i ) = θˆi(t
4
i ) = θ
2
i for i = 1, 2. The
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common prior µ is described in Figure 2. Conditional on agent 1’s payoff
type being θk1 , his beliefs about agent 2’s types are (1/6, 2/6, 1/6, 2/6) with
probability 0.5, and (2/6, 1/6, 2/6, 1/6) with probability 0.5. This probability
does not depend on k. Therefore, for agent 1, beliefs and payoff types are
independent. A similar calculation shows that also for agent 2 beliefs and












































Figure 2.1: The common prior µ in Example 1
There is an equivalent representation of the type space in Example 1.
Note that in Example 1 the pair of the agents’ payoff types, (θˆ1, θˆ2), is in-
dependent of the pair of the agents’ belief types, (bˆ1, bˆ2). This is a stronger
property than the independence property which only requires independence
of payoff types and belief types agent by agent. In Example 1 one can then
imagine types being determined by two independent draws: one draw de-
termines (θ1, θ2), and another draw determines (b1, b2). We describe these
draws in Figure 2, where the left square represents the common prior for the
draw of (θ1, θ2), and the right square represents the common prior for the
pair (b1, b2). We denote the common prior distribution of payoff types by µ
′,
the two possible belief types of each agent by b1i and b
2
i (in the order that
they were listed in the description of Example 1), and the common prior




























Figure 2.2: An equivalent representation of the common prior in Example 1:
µ = µ′ × µ′′.
Now note a further independence: the distribution of payoff types is a
product distribution, that is, payoff types are independent across agents.
This implies that agents’ beliefs about other agents’ payoff types are in fact
constant in the model, and therefore common knowledge, as they are when
types are drawn independently. The variation in agents’ beliefs stems from
the variation in their beliefs about other variables, that are not payoff related.
These are captured by the belief distribution in Figure 2. Note that this
distribution is not a product distribution.
The main result of this paper is that a similar representation as the one
in Figure 2 can be given for any type space with the independence property.
Proposition 3. A type space has the independence property if and only if
µ(t1, t2, . . . tN) = µ(θ1)µ(θ2) . . . µ(θn)µ(b1, b2, . . . , bn) (2.4)
for all (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ T .
Proof. It is immediate that (2.4) implies that θˆi and bˆi are independent for
each agent. We prove that (2.4) is necessary for the independence property
in three claims.
Claim 1: For all i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi, bi ∈ Bi, θ−i ∈ Θ−i, bi ∈ B−i:
µ(θ−i, b−i|θi, bi) = µ(θ−i, b−i|bi) (2.5)
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Proof.


























= µ(θ−i, b−i|θi, bi) (2.6)
Here, the fifth and sixth line follow from the definition of belief types.
Claim 2: For all i ∈ N, θ ∈ Θ, b ∈ B:
µ(θ, b) = µ(θi)µ(θ−i, b). (2.7)
Proof.
µ(θ, b) = µ(θi, bi)µ(θ−i, b−i|θi, bi)
= µ(θi)µ(bi)µ(θ−i, b−i|θi, bi)
= µ(θi)µ(bi)µ(θ−i, b−i|bi)
= µ(θi)µ(θ−i, b) (2.8)
The second line follows from the independence property, and the third line
follows from Claim 1.
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Claim 3:5 If for all i ∈ N, θ ∈ Θ, b ∈ B:
µ(θ, b) = µ(θi)µ(θ−i, b), (2.9)
then for all θ ∈ Θ, b ∈ B:
µ(θ, b) = µ(θ1)µ(θ2) . . . µ(θN)µ(b) (2.10)
Proof. We prove this by induction over n, beginning with the case n = 2.
By assumption:
µ(θ1, θ2, b) = µ(θ2)µ(θ1, b). (2.11)
Therefore, we can complete the proof by showing:
µ(θ1, b) = µ(θ1)µ(b). (2.12)
By assumption:
µ(θ1, θ2, b) = µ(θ1)µ(θ2, b). (2.13)
Summing (2.13) over all θ2, we obtain (2.12).
Now suppose the claim had been shown for all numbers of agents up to
some number n ≥ 2. We prove the claim for n+ 1. By assumption:
µ(θ, b) = µ(θn+1)µ(θ−(n+1), b) (2.14)
Therefore, we can complete the proof by showing:
µ(θ−(n+1), b) = µ(θ1)µ(θ2) . . . µ(θn)µ(b) (2.15)
5Claim 3 and its proof are identical to Lemma 4.6 and its proof in Aumann and
Brandenburger (1995), except that the type space in Aumann and Brandenburger’s model
does not include a component that is analogous to the component “b” in our type space. We
comment further on the relation between our work and that of Aumann and Brandenburger
in the paragraph following the proof of Proposition 1.
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We prove this using the inductive assumption. For this, it is sufficient to
show that the “if-condition” of Claim 3 holds for (θ−(n+1), b):
µ(θ−(n+1), b) = µ(θi)µ(θ−(i,n+1), b) (2.16)
for all i 6= n+ 1. This is implied by the “if-condition” of Claim 3 for (θ, b):
µ(θ, b) = µ(θi)µ(θ−i, b) (2.17)
if we sum over all θn+1.
Proposition 1 is subtly related to Theorem B in Aumann and Branden-
burger (1995). In Aumann and Brandenburger’s model a type space describes
hierarchies of beliefs over strategies, not over payoff types. However, one can
reinterpret their model, replacing strategies by payoff types. Aumann and
Brandenburger then investigate the assumption that beliefs about other play-
ers’ payoff types are common knowledge. They infer that beliefs have to be
product measures.6 Their assumption is stronger than ours, as the assump-
tion that beliefs are common knowledge implies that they are independent
of payoff types, but it is in another sense weaker, because it only refers to
beliefs about payoff types, not to beliefs about types per se. Their conclusion
is similar to ours, except that their conclusion does not address the possible
existence of redundant types.
We can translate Aumann and Brandenburger’s result into our setting.
Suppose we say that a fact is common knowledge in our model if it is true
for every t ∈ T .7 In particular, let us say that agent i’s beliefs are common
6Combining this with the assumption of mutual knowledge of rationality, they obtain
that beliefs form a Nash equilibrium.
7Our assumption of full support beliefs for every type implies that the standard defi-
nition of a fact being common knowledge reduces in our model to the condition that the
fact is true for all t.
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knowledge if there is some bi ∈ ∆(T−i) such that bˆi(ti) = bi for all ti ∈ Ti.
Then Aumann and Brandenburger’s proof of their Theorem B shows:
Remark 1. All agents’ beliefs are common knowledge if and only if for all
t ∈ T :
µ(t) = µ(t1)µ(t2) . . . µ(tn). (2.18)
The proof of this remark is essentially the same as the proof of Proposition
1. In particular, to show that (2.18) is necessary for beliefs to be common
knowledge, one begins with the observation that the constancy of belief types
implies: µ(t−i|ti)µ(t−i) for all t ∈ T , which is the analog of Claim 1. The
proof continues with analogs of Claims 2 and 3, omitting, as in the analog
of Claim 1, the conditioning on belief types, as belief types are the same
everywhere in the type space.
We mentioned already in the Introduction and at the beginning of this
section that type spaces with independent types are important in the liter-
ature, yet extremely special. We noted at the beginning of this section that
independent types imply that beliefs about others’ types are common knowl-
edge. Remark 1 adds to this the observation that the reverse is also true:
common knowledge of beliefs implies that types are independent. Remark 1
thus characterizes the most prominent special case of type spaces with the
independence property.8
2.4 Implications for Game Theory
Now we introduce a game played by the n agents whom we have also consid-
ered so far. The (finite) sets of pure actions in this game are: S1, S2, . . . , Sn.
Also, for each player a utility function ui : S1 × S2 × . . . × Sn × Θ → R is
8A small caveat is that Remark 1, unlike our earlier comments, covers type spaces in
which types and payoff types are not the same.
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given. If we combine a type space with the action sets and utility functions,
then we obtain a game of incomplete information. We shall refer to this game
as “the incomplete information game generated by the type space.” A pure
strategy of player i is a mapping: σi : Θi → Si. Denote the set of all pure
strategies of player i by Σi. We define: Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi.
Our goal is to find a connection between the Bayesian equilibria of a
game generated by a type space that has the independence property and the
equilibria, for an appropriate equilibrium concept, of the game in which we
have dropped the payoff irrelevant component from the type space. If we find
such a relation, it will be possible to analyze games with independent payoff
and belief types without taking account of the possibility of payoff irrelevant
information, and yet at the same time capture the results that an analysis
of the Bayesian equilibria of all incomplete information games generated by
a type space with independent payoff and belief types would yield.
It turns out that for our purposes the relevant equilibrium concept for
the analysis of the game without payoff irrelevant information is a version
of correlated equilibrium. Care is needed regarding the precise definition
of a correlated equilibrium. Cotters (1991, 1994), Forges (1993, 2006), Liu
(2011), and others distinguish different notions of correlated equilibria of
incomplete information games. In this paper the appropriate notion is what
Forges refers to as “strategic form correlated equilibrium” (Cotters, 1991,
and Forges, 1993). A “strategic form correlated equilibrium” is a probability
distribution γ on Σ that is a correlated equilibrium in the sense of Aumann
(1974, 1987) of the strategic form of the incomplete information game. A
Bayesian equilibrium is a strategic form correlated equilibrium γ that is the
product of its marginals on the n pure strategy sets Σi.
9
To conduct our analysis formally, we next need to be precise about what
9To simplify our notation, we use Milgrom and Weber’s (1985) distributional approach
to the representation of mixed strategies.
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it means to drop the sets Bi from a type space, and what it means to re-
introduce them. This is done in the following definition.
Definition 9. (i) For given type space with the independence property ((Ti)i∈N ,
(θˆi)i∈N , µ) such that: Ti = Θi × Bi, the corresponding reduced type space
((T ′i )i∈N , (θˆ
′
i)i∈N , µ
′) is: ((T ′i )i∈N , (θˆ
′
i)i∈N , µ
′) where: T ′i = Θi for all i ∈ N ,
θˆ′i(θi) = θi for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, and µ′(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) = µ(θ1)µ(θ2) . . . µ(θn)
for all (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ.
(ii) For given type space with the independence property ((Ti)i∈N , (θˆi)i∈N , µ)
where Ti = Θi for all i ∈ N , a corresponding augmented type space ((T ′i )i∈N ,
(θˆ′i)i∈N , µ
′) is a type space with the independence property such that the cor-
responding reduced space is ((Ti)i∈N , (θˆi)i∈N , µ).
Next, we introduce a correspondence between a vector of mixed strategies
for an incomplete information game generated by a type space with the inde-
pendence property and a correlated strategy for the incomplete information
game generated by the type space for which the payoff irrelevant information
is dropped.
Definition 10. Let γ be a product distribution on the set of pure strategy
combinations Σ in the incomplete information game generated by a type space
with the independence property. Then the equivalent probability distribution
γ′ on the set of pure strategy combinations Σ′ in the game generated by the




(γ(s)µ ({(b1, . . . , bN)|si(θi, bi) = s′i(θi) for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi}))
(2.19)
for all s′ ∈ Σ′.
Our result is:
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Proposition 4. (i) Let γ be a Bayesian equilibrium of the incomplete infor-
mation game generated by a type space with the independence property. Then
the equivalent probability distribution γ′ on the set of pure strategy combina-
tions Σ′ in the incomplete information game generated by the corresponding
reduced type space is a strategic form correlated equilibrium of that incomplete
information game.
(ii) Let γ′ be a strategic form correlated equilibrium of the incomplete
information game generated by a type space with the independence property
in which Ti = Θi for all i ∈ N . Then there is a corresponding augmented
type space, and a product distribution γ on the space of pure strategies Σ′ in
the incomplete information game generated by the augmented type space such
that γ′ is equivalent to γ, and such that γ is a Bayesian equilibrium of that
incomplete information game.
Proposition 2 is a re-statement of the revelation principle for our model.
We therefore omit a formal proof. Cotter (1991, p. 54) and Forges (1993,
p. 289) observed that the revelation principle applies to the strategic form
correlated equilibrium. An appropriately phrased version of part (i) of Propo-
sition 2 remains true if one replaces strategic form correlated equilibrium by
agent normal form correlated equilibrium, because, roughly speaking, every
strategic form correlated equilibrium is also an agent normal form correlated
equilibrium (Forgers, p. 290). It is not true, however, that every agent nor-
mal form correlated equilibrium is a strategic form correlated equilibrium
(see Example 3 in Forges (1993)), and thus part (ii) of Proposition 2 does
not hold for agent normal form correlated equilibria.
The question answered by Proposition 2 for Bayesian equilibria can also
be asked for other game theoretic solution concepts. An alternative to
Bayesian equilibria is in particular the concept of rationalizability. Several
notions of rationalizability for incomplete information games have been pro-
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posed in the literature. If we employ the concept of “interim correlated ra-
tionalizability” as defined by Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007), then the
result is simple. According to Proposition 1 in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris
(2007), the set of interim correlated rationalizable strategies of a player only
depends on that player’s hierarchy of beliefs about payoff relevant informa-
tion. It is not affected by payoff irrelevant information included in the type
space. Therefore, it is without loss of generality in our context, in which we
postulate the independence property, to analyze the set of interim correlated
rationalizable strategies using the reduced type space in which only payoff
types are included.
2.5 Implications for Mechanism Design
Next, we examine the implications of our analysis for mechanism design. We
consider the same n agents as in the previous sections, as well as a mecha-
nism designer. There are a (finite) set of possible outcomes Y , and for every
agent i a utility function ui : Θ×Y → R. The mechanism designer supposes
that the agents’ information is described by a type space with the indepen-
dence property. The mechanism designer chooses a game form, consisting
of strategy sets for each agent, a mapping of strategies into outcomes, and
a Bayesian equilibrium of the incomplete information game defined by the
game form, the utility functions, and the type space. We leave the mech-
anism designer’s objective function unspecified except that we assume that
it only depends on the implied mapping between agents’ payoff types and
probability distributions over outcomes. By the revelation principle we can
restrict attention to direct game forms q : T → ∆(Y ) such that truth telling
is a Bayesian equilibrium in the corresponding incomplete information game.
We refer to such direct game forms as “incentive compatible.”
Our objective is to find a correspondence between the direct and incentive
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compatible mechanisms for a type space with the independence property
and the direct and incentive compatible mechanisms for the corresponding
reduced type space. Here, we use the terminology for type spaces introduced
in the previous section. We shall find such a correspondence if we focus on the
mapping between payoff types and probability distribution over outcomes.
As we have postulated that the mechanism designer’s objective depends only
on that mapping, our result implies that mechanisms that are optimal for a
type space with the independence property and mechanisms that are optimal
for the the corresponding type space in which all payoff irrelevant information
has been removed can achieve exactly the same values of the mechanism
designer’s objective function. It is therefore without loss of generality to
study the mechanism designer’s maximization problem only for the reduced
type space, as the literature has mostly done.
We first define how we relate direct mechanisms for a type space with
the independence property to direct mechanisms for the same type space but
without payoff irrelevant information.
Definition 11. (i) Consider a direct mechanism q : T → ∆(Y ) for a type
space with the independence property. The equivalent direct mechanism for
the corresponding reduced type space is the mechanism q′ : T ′ → ∆(Y )




(q((θ, b), y)µ(b)) . (2.20)
Here q(t, y) denotes the probability that a direct mechanism assigns to out-
come y when the vector of types is t.
(ii) Consider a type space with the independence property where T ′i = Θi
for all i ∈ N , and a corresponding augmented type space. Let q : T ′ → ∆(Y )
be a direct mechanism for the first type space. Then the equivalent direct
mechanism for the augmented type space is the mechanism q : T → ∆(Y )
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where for every t = (θi, bi)i∈N and y ∈ Y we have:
q(t, y) = q′(θ, y). (2.21)
Our result is:
Proposition 5. (i) If a direct mechanism q : T → ∆(Y ) for a type space with
the independence property is incentive compatible, then the equivalent direct
mechanism for the corresponding reduced type space is incentive compatible.
(ii) If a direct mechanism q : T → ∆(Y ) for a type space with the indepen-
dence property and with T ′i = Θi for all i ∈ N is incentive compatible, then
the equivalent direct mechanism for a corresponding augmented type space is
incentive compatible.
Part (ii) is immediate, as in the augmented type space agents simply
ignore the payoff irrelevant information B which then is strategically irrel-
evant as well. Like Proposition 2, part (i) of Proposition 3 is a version of
the revelation principle. In particular, suppose the true type space were the
reduced type space, but the mechanism designer provided the payoff irrele-
vant information B to agents as part of an extensive form mechanism. By
the standard revelation principle, the mechanism could collapse such an ex-
tensive form mechanism into a direct mechanism in which truth-telling is an
equilibrium. This is essentially what part (i) of Proposition 3 says. We omit
the proof of Proposition 3.
Propositions 2 and 3 together indicate that a mechanism designer’s range
of possibilities does not expand if the mechanism designer is allowed to sug-
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Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory assume that players act ratio-
nally given their beliefs of other players’ actions, and players’ beliefs about
other players’ actions are consistent with what other players actually do.
That is, equilibrium concepts are defined by rationality and mutual consis-
tency. However, in many real world games, standard equilibrium predictions
are often far from actual choices players make, and sometimes players seem to
have mistaken beliefs about other players’ choices. For example, in a beauty
contest game, players are asked to choose a number between 0 and 100, and
the player whose number is closest of 2/3 of the average wins a prize. The
assumptions of players’ rationality and consistency of players’ beliefs imply
that the unique Nash equilibrium is all players choosing zero. However, when
the beauty contest is played in experimental settings, the average choice is
typically between 20 and 35, as first pointed out by Nagel (1995).
In response to the implausibility of standard equilibrium predictions of
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the beauty contest game, Camerer, Ho, and Chung (2004) suggest a cognitive
hierarchy model (a CH model). In the CH model, there is a cognitive type
space {0, 1, 2, . . . , K}, and each player draws a type. A 0 type player does
not assume anything about other players and chooses according to a fixed
probability distribution on [0,100]. A k type player assumes that their oppo-
nents are distributed from step 0 to step k − 1, so he ignores the possibility
that some players may be doing as many or more steps of reasoning com-
pared to himself. A k type player can correctly anticipate what lower type
players will choose at each period. All players with types greater than zero
maximize utilities based on their beliefs of other players’ choices. Then the
model implies that one-shot beauty contest game will result in players choos-
ing numbers significantly greater than 0, thus explaining real world players’
behavior.
In the CH model, players’ reasoning abilities are restricted to have k lim-
its on thinking steps, and also players are overconfident and not aware of
other players who use as many thinking steps as them. Therefore, Camerer,
Ho and Chong (2004) relax two assumptions in standard equilibrium theory
to define the cognitive hierarchy model. They assume that players’ iterative
reasoning abilities are limited, and players have incorrect beliefs about the
cognitive type space. I suggest 2 reasons why relaxing two above assump-
tions simultaneously could be implausible, and suggest a modified cognitive
hierarchy model in which players’ assessments of the cognitive type space are
correct.
First, the original CH model performs poorly in explaining the experi-
mental results of repeated beauty contest game. As Camerer, Ho and Chong
(2004) and Sbriglia (2009) observe, real world players’ choices in repeated
beauty contest game approach quickly to the unique Nash equilibrium. Then
the CH model implies that all players’ cognitive limits are rapidly increased
when a beauty contest game is repeated. That explanation seems to be im-
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plausible given Camerer, Ho, and Chung (2004)’s interpretation on players’
cognitive limits, because it not likely that players’ limits on steps of thinking
could increase dramatically in short intervals of the repeated game.
Second, it is not clear why 2 assumptions in the standard equilibrium
theory should be simultaneously relaxed. The CH model first assumes a
cognitive type space with players’ limited thinking abilities, and then assumes
heterogenous prior on the cognitive type space. Note that a player’s limit on
iterative thinking ability is different from his inability to correctly specify the
true prior on the cognitive type space. For the latter assumption, Camerer,
Ho, and Chung (2004) explain that people are frequently overconfident, and
a brain has limits and does not always understand its own limits. However,
people are often aware of other people who are smarter than themselves,
and even if a brain might not understand its own limits, it might know the
existence of things which are incomprehensible. It might be better to relax
only the assumption of players’ unlimited reasoning abilities so that we can
distill only the consequences of the introduction of the cognitive type space.
In response, I suggest a modified cognitive hierarchy model, in which I
assume the existence of cognitive type space and players’ limits on reasoning
abilities as in the original CH model. However, I maintain the common prior
assumption on the cognitive type space, and players know the existence of
equal or higher type players. Note that there might be discrepancy between
the realized distribution of cognitive types from the prior, especially if the
number of players is not big. When a k type player chooses an action,
he estimates of all other players’ actions, including equal or higher type
players’ choices. Whereas a k type player always correctly predicts what
other 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 type players will choose, he can only guess equal or
higher type players’ choices due to his limit on the thinking ability, using
past data to anticipate equal or higher type players’ choices. Players also
use past data to improve their estimations on the realized distribution of
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cognitive types. Therefore, players use deductive reasoning to predict lower
types’ actions, and learning, or inductive reasoning, to predict equal or higher
players’ actions.
The modified CH model combines players’ utility maximization and learn-
ing, so it is meaningful in explaining real-world behavior of players in repeated
interactions. Proposition 1 shows that if the modified CH model dynamics
converge for a given repeated game, it converges to a Nash equilibrium. In
the modified CH model, players only use learning, or inductive reasoning, to
assist their deductive reasoning. Thus, the model provides explanations why
in real world, players sometimes appear to use only deductive reasoning and
sometimes try to learn other players’ behavior by their past actions. In that
sense, the model suggests a new direction for both behavioral models with
bounded rationality, and learning models in game theory. Therefore, it is
natural to compare the modified CH model to existing learning models.
There are two broad categories of learning models, the replicator dynam-
ics and the fictitious play. First, the replicator dynamics assume that players
are programmed to play fixed pure strategies. As the game is repeatedly
played, the players with strategies that result in higher payoffs reproduce
faster than other players with strategies that result in lower payoffs. Bo¨rgers
and Sarin (1997) showed that a learning model converges to a replicator dy-
namic in continuous time limit, so that they provided an interpretation of
the replicator dynamics as a learning model. In contrast with the replicator
dynamics, the modified CH model assumes that players are utility maximiz-
ers, and use learning only partially to update their estimations of equal or
higher type players’ choices. Second, the fictitious play models assume that
players believe that there is a fixed distribution of all other players’ choices,
(which is wrong because all other players also follow the fictitious play) so
players use only past data to form estimation of other players’ choices. The
modified CH model assumes that players have better understandings about
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other players’ behavior, and they use past data only to assist deductive rea-
soning. Also, the modified CH model assumes that players know that other
players have different cognitive types, and more information about other
players’ individual choices are given, players will utilize such data. On the
other hand, with fictitious play, individual choice data would not be useful.
In addition, in both existing learning models, the initial conditions and first
period choices are exogenously given, but in the modified CH model, first
period choices are endogenously decided by utility maximization. Detailed
theoretical comparisons with other models will be given in section 3.
As a behavioral model, the modified CH model should provide explana-
tions for empirical findings. First, the modified CH model predicts that in
repeated beauty contest game, players’ choices will converge to the unique
Nash equilibrium outcome by the learning process. That is exactly what
Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) and Sbriglia (2009) observed in experiments
of the repeated beauty contest game. Therefore, the modified CH model
improves the original CH model in explaining the experimental results of the
repeated beauty contest game. Detailed discussions are found in section 4.
The modified CH model also provides explanations for the experimental
findings of the repeated market entry game with multiple players. In the
market entry game, players are asked to choose to either enter or stay out of
a given market, and players will enjoy higher utility by entering if and only if
there are less players choosing to enter than the market size. Duffy and Hop-
kins (2005) conduct experiments on the repeated market entry game, and
compare experimental findings with predictions of the replicator dynamics
and the fictitious play. They find that players’ choices tend to converge to
pure strategy Nash equilibria as the market entry game is repeated, which
might be explained by either of the existing learning models. However, they
couldn’t explain the following result by the replicator dynamics or the fic-
titious play: when players are given the information about other players’
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individual choices, the speed of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is much
faster than the case when players’ are only given the information about other
players’ aggregate choices. Also, their experiments show a large variance for
the speed of convergence even with same information treatment. The mod-
ified CH model provides better explanations for Duffy and Hopkins’ (2005)
experimental results compared to other learning models. Detailed compar-
isons with other learning models in the experimental repeated market entry
game as in Duffy and Hopkins (2005) are found in section 5.
Related Literature
There is a large literature on “level-k” models, such as Stahl and Wil-
son (1995), Nagel (1995), and Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001).
However, in the level-k literature, players’ cognitive types do not necessarily
mean their k level iterative reasoning abilities. Rather, Stahl and Wilson
(1995) defined a level k type player as a player who has a wrong model of all
other players so that he thinks all other players have 0 to k − 1 types.
It is Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004)’s cognitive hierarchy model that
interpreted the level-k type as the cognitive limit on the iterative reasoning
of players, while maintaining the assumption in the level-k literature so that
players have wrong models about other players. In this paper, players have
the correct model about other players so that there is a common prior on the
cognitive type space. Players acknowledge the existence of equal or higher
type players, and use deductive reasoning to estimate and learn about those
incomprehensible choices.
There is a large literature about learning in game theory, as reviewed by
Fudenberg and Levine (1998). There are two broad categories of existing
learning theory: the replicator dynamics and the fictitious play. I provide
comparisons of the modified CH model and existing learning theories in sec-
tion 3.
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Sbriglia (2009) observed that in experiments of the repeated beauty con-
test game, players’ choices converge to Nash equilibrium. Moreover, he ob-
served that the speed of convergence depend on the level of information that
the players receive after each period. This paper discusses the relationship
between Sbriglia’s (2009) experimental findings and the modified CH model
in section 4.
Erev and Rapoport (1998) and Duffy and Hopkins (2005) conducts exper-
iments on the repeated market entry game. Especially, Duffy and Hopkins
(2005) try to use learning theories (the replicator dynamics and the fictitious
play) to explain their empirical findings. I provides explanation of their ex-
perimental findings by the modified CH model, and compare the new model
with existing learning models in section 5.
Plan of the Paper
In section 2, I will define the modified cognitive hierarchy model for re-
peated strategic form games. Section 3 defines convergence and stability of
the model and observe some basic consequences. Section 4 provides theoret-
ical comparisons with other models. Section 5 studies the repeated beauty
contest game and provides theoretical and empirical consequences of the
modified CH model in comparison with the original CH model. Section 6
studies the repeated market entry game and provides theoretical and empiri-
cal consequences of the modified CH model in comparison with the replicator
dynamics and the fictitious play. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 The Modified Cognitive Hierarchy Model
Throughout this paper, I consider complete information strategic form games
G ≡ {N,A, u}, where N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of players, A ⊂ R is
the finite set of actions shared by all players, and u : A × A¯ → R is the
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utility function shared by all players. A player i’s utility depends on his own
choice a ∈ A, and the average of the choice of all players, a¯ ∈ A¯, where A¯
is the set of all real numbers between the minimum and the maximum of
A.1 Therefore, this paper only considers symmetric games where all players
share same set of actions and same utility function.2 Game G is repeated
for periods t ≡ {1, 2, . . . , }. In the model, the amount of information each
player gets at the end of each stage is important for players’ decision making
processes. I consider two possible information structures for repeated game
as follows:
• (Aggregate Information Structure) : After each period t, players
are informed about at ∈ A¯, a number representing the average choice
of all players at period t.
• (Full Information Structure) After each period t, players are in-
formed about all players’ individual choices, ati ∈ A, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Before the game, players independently draw types from a cognitive
type space, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, which is associated with a common prior
p ∈ ∆{1, 2, . . . , K}. A type k player is assumed to be able to perform k
times of iterative optimizations. Note that the common prior assumption
implies that players know the existence of equal or higher type players. Note
that the realized cognitive type distribution might be different from the com-
mon prior p, especially when the number of players, N , is small.3
1Note that A ∈ R, so the average number a¯ ∈ A¯ of all players’ choices can be calculated
to decide utility given all possible a ∈ A chosen.
2Current setting is a simplification and the modified cognitive hierarchy model can
be defined for games with heterogenous sets of actions and utility functions for players,
incomplete information games, and(or) extensive form games.
3In this paper, the different assumptions on the information structure affects players’
update processes of estimations of the realized distribution of the cognitive types. Detailed
explanation will be provided later.
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At each period t, players maximize per-period payoffs based on their
estimations of all other players’ choices at that period. There are several
characteristics of the modified CH model that I wish to highlight before de-
scribing actual estimation processes. The following assumptions are made
largely for the simplicity of the model. First, players are assumed to be
myopic and do not think in advance, and they don’t care about reputation
effects. Second, at each period t, players make point estimations for 2 un-
knowns: the realized cognitive type distribution and equal or higher type
players’ choices at that period.4 Therefore, players don’t have distributional
beliefs about those unknowns at each period. Third, when players use past
choice data to estimate the realized cognitive type distribution and equal or
higher type players’ choices, they use lexicographic order in the estimation
process with conservative update rule for the realized cognitive type space.
At the start of each period t, players compare the newly updated choice data
for other players with theoretical predictions for lower type players’ choices
and change the old estimation for the realized cognitive distribution only
when the old estimation is incongruent with new data. After that, players
use the previous choice data of other players to make estimations for equal
or higher type players’ choices at period t. Therefore, it is assumed that
players treat two different unknowns differently. Those points will be made
clear with the detailed explanation of the model.
Players’ decision rules for repeated game depend on the information they
receive after each period. First, I recursively define players’ decision rules
with the aggregate information structure . At period 1, a type 1 player
knows that all other players are of equal or higher types compared to himself.
Because he is not able to deduce other players’ reasonings and optimize
4As will be explained shortly, players know exactly what other players with lower types
will choose at period t, so that they don’t need to make estimations for lower type players’
choices.
88
against them, a type 1 player makes a fixed estimation (which is known to
all players with types higher than 1) for all other players’ choices.5
Then consider a type k player’s estimation about other players’ choices in
period 1. Note that a k type player’s assessment of the realized distribution
of types about other players might be wrong because he only knows the prior
p on the type space. That possible difference between the prior and the
realized distribution is more important if the number of players, N , is small.
However, in period 1, a k type player doesn’t have any information to infer
the realized distribution on the type space, other than the prior. Denote a
type k player’s estimation of the number of type ` players at period t for
` < k as (qtk,`)
k−1
`=1 .
6 Then q1k,` ≡ p(`)N for ` < k.7 That is, at period 1, a k
type player assumes that the realized number of a lower type ` is the same
as given from the common prior. At period 1, a k type player knows what
lower type players think, and follow their reasoning to correctly calculate all
lower type players’ decisions for each lower type ` < k. Then he use q1k,` for
` < k to calculate lower type players’ aggregate choices. In contrast, he uses
a fixed estimation (which is known to all players with types higher than k)
for equal or higher type players’ choices, and use N −
k−1∑`
=1
q1k,` for the number
of equal or higher type players, and calculate equal or higher type players’
aggregate choices .
5It is natural that type 1 player cannot correctly predict other type 1 players’ choices.
If it were possible, then a type 1 player would first simulate other type 1 players’ choices
by an optimization, and then optimize to the result. Therefore, type 1 player would be
able to perform optimizations twice, contradicting the assumption that he can perform
only 1 optimization per period.
6A k type player might also have estimations of the number of equal or higher type
players. However, such estimation is not used by a k type player because he cannot deduce
any meaningful conclusion about equal or higher type players’ choices.
7When p(`)N is not a natural number, set q1k,` as the closest natural number to p(`)N .
For notational convenience, I denote it as just q1k,` ≡ p(`)N , and such notational abuse is
maintained throughout the paper.
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Consider a type k player’s decision making process at period t > 1. First,
at the start of period t, a k type player updates his estimation of (qtk,`)
k−1
`=1 as
follows. If observed data from period 1 to period t− 1 is incongruent to the
previous estimation (qt−1k,` )
k−1




`=1 so that the difference of
total number of per-type players with the previous estimation is the smallest.8
When there are multiple possible choices for estimation change according to
the above rule, then choose a new estimation that always changes the number
of lower type players. For example, assume observed data by a k type player
is such that either estimated number of type 1 players should be decreased
by 1 or type 2 players should be decreased by 1. Then a type k player would
choose new estimation that decreases the number of type 1 players by 1. A
k type player combines updated (qtk,`)
k−1
`=1 with the accurate predictions for
lower type players’ choices to calculate aggregate estimations of lower type
players’ choices. In sum, in this model, players are assumed to make point
estimations for realized cognitive types of other players, and they change
their previous estimations only when there is enough evidence to do so.
Then consider a k type players’ estimation of equal or higher type players’
choices at period t. Because a type k player cannot deduce what equal
or higher type will do, he estimates equal and higher type players’ choices
by past data. In this paper, I assume that all players use fixed weighted
moving average of equal and higher type players’ past choices to estimate
their current choices. Denote a type k player’s estimation of the average
number of all equal or higher type players’ choices at period t as etk ∈ A¯.
Also, denote a type k player’s chosen action at period t as atk ∈ A. Then we
8Note that with aggregate information structure, a k type player can detect the differ-
ence between (qt−1k,` )
k−1
`=1 and realized distribution only in the case when there is a lower
type whose realized number of players is strictly less than the current estimation given by
(qt−1k,` )
k−1
`=1 . That is, if the realized number of lower type players is larger than the current
estimation of that type, a k type player cannot detect the abnormality because from the k
type player’s point of view, there might be some equal or higher type players who happen
to choose same actions with that lower type.
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have:
Assumption 2. (Estimation rule with aggregate information struc-
ture) With aggregate information structure, a k type player estimates the
aggregate choice of all equal or higher type players as follows. There exists
a constant I and constants {Ai}Ii=1 with Ai ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I},
I∑
i=1






















for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, and t ∈ {2, 3, . . .}
All players use the past weighted moving average of derived average
choices of all equal or higher type players, with weights given by (Ai)
I
i=1 for
past periods (t− 1, t− 2, . . . , t− I) . The average choices of equal or higher
type players are calculated by subtracting the estimated average choices of
lower type players from the average choice of all players. In sum, at period
t, players conservatively update their estimations on the number of lower
type players, (qtk,`)
k−1
`=1 , and they discard the oldest aggregate data c
t−I−1 and
add newest one ct−1 to make estimations about equal or higher type play-
ers as given in Assumption 1. The weights, {Ai}Ii=1, are only restricted to
be non-negative, so Assumption 1 encompasses various possible estimation
rules.
Based on their estimations of all other players’ choices at that period, all
type players choose actions to maximize their per-period expected utilities. In
the modified CH model, players are always assumed to choose pure strategies,
and higher type players are assumed to know decision rules of lower type
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players with the following assumptions. First, each player type uses a number
to estimate equal or higher type players’ choices at period 1, and that number
is known to higher type players. Second, when there are multiple actions that
maximize a k type player’s expected utility, he always chooses an action with
lowest label in the set A. Again, that is also known to higher type players.
The above assumptions are simplifications. While it is natural that higher
type players can correctly follow lower type players’ reasoning, it might not
be always true that higher type players always have correct knowledge about
lower type players’ actual choices. In the real world, higher type players’
anticipations about lower type players’ choices might also have some error
terms, which include random choices at period 1 and possible random choices
with indifference.
Next, I define players’ decision making processes with full information
structure, when players are informed about individual choices of all other
players at the end of each period. With more information, players are able
to infer more information about the realized distribution on the cognitive
type space, and also players are able to detect possible correlation between
equal or higher type players’ past choices. Players’ period 1 decision making
processes are given as the same with the aggregate information structure,
with q1k,` ≡ p(`)N for ` < k and for all k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , K}.
Then consider what happens in period k. At the start of period t, a k
type player first determines (qtk,` ≡ p(`))k−1`=1 as the following. A k type player
starts with previous period’s type realization estimation (qt−1k,` ≡ p(`))k−1`=1 , and
he changes it only when there is enough evidence to do that. First, a k type
player compares all other players’ previous play records with his prediction of
all lower type players’ previous play. Starting from player n′ = 1,(according
to the given player labeling N ≡ {1, 2, . . . , N}), if player 1’s previous play
record is congruent to k type player’s calculation of player type 1’s play, then
player 1 is assigned to be a tentative type 1 player for the period t. If not,
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move to compare player 1’s previous play record with a type 2 player’s play,
up to type k − 1. A k type player stops comparing n′ players’ previous play
record with type 1’s play when qt−1k,1 number of players are assigned to type 1.
In this manner, a k type player goes over players n′ = 1, 2, . . . , N (excluding
himself) to assign other players to tentative lower types ` = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
If the number of players assigned to ` type after going over all other players
is less than qt−1k,` , then q
t
k,` is decreased accordingly. Therefore, a k type
player can adjust qtk,` when there is evidence that the number of realized
` type player is less than qt−1k,` . For the other direction in adjusting q
t
k,`,
assume that there is a large enough t¯ such that at period t¯, a player type
k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , K} possibly increases qtk,` for ` = {1, 2, . . . , k − 1} if there are
more players whose previous record is the same as k type’s play estimation
for ` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}.9 Note that there needs to be only one such t¯ that
players might increase their estimations of the realized numbers of lower
type players. After t¯, the estimations for lower type players can only decrease
because players identify another player as a lower type only when all previous
choice records are congruent to a lower type’s theoretical past choices.
After fixing (qtk,`)
k−1
`=1 and assigned tentative lower types to other players,
a k type player uses past play data of perceived equal or higher types to
estimate their choices at period t. Note that with full information structure,
a k type player can detect possible correlation between other players’ previous
play records. Most importantly, he can detect that some other players always
choose the same strategy, which results from the fact that they are of the
same higher type. Denote a k type’s perceived number of equal or higher
type players at period t as N −
k−1∑`
=1
qtk,` ≡ k. A k type player subtracts the
9This is a simplification. A k type player might have a threshold probability so that
at each period, if the probability of the case where a higher type player’s previous play
record happens to be the same as ` type’s play becomes lower than the threshold, then
the k type player would increase qtk,`. Then the model becomes too complicated.
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number of all players with perceived lower types at period t from N . Then
the k type player relabel all perceived equal or higher type players as the
same order in the original labeling N , so that the remaining players has new
label k ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,k}. For each period t′ < t, a k type player has data for
all perceived equal or higher type player’s play, which is recorded in a kth
order tensor, At
′
k with size |A| × |A| × . . . , |A|, where each element (which
is 0 or 1) indicates the actions chosen by each player in k. For example, let
k = 3, at period t for a type k. It means that a k type player thinks there
are 3 equal or higher type players at period t. Then the k type player has
data represented by At
′
k for all previous periods t
′ = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1, and each
of At
′
k is a 3rd order tensor. If the tensor A
1
k contains the element a2,1,4 = 1,
it means that in period 1, (supposedly equal or higher type) player 1 (as in
the new labeling k ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,k}) chose the second action in A, player 2
chose the first action, and player 3 chose the fourth action. Denote a k type
player’s probabilistic estimation of equal or higher type players’ choices at
period t as Etk. Note that E
t
k is also a kth order tensor.
Assumption 3. (Estimation rule with full information structure)
With full information structure, a k type player estimates choices of per-
ceived equal or higher type players as follows. There exists a constant I and
constants {Ai}Ii=1 with Ai ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I},
I∑
i=1







for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, and t ∈ {2, 3, . . .}
Therefore, with full information structure, a k type player uses the weighted
moving average of perceived equal or higher type players’ past choice data
to estimate their choices, taking into account possible correlation between
them.
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Then we have the following observation:
Observation 9. The full information structure implies the followings with
players’ decision making process in the modified CH model compared to the
aggregate information structure:
• Players’ assessments for realized distribution of the cognitive type space
are corrected faster, with higher possibility to identify the correct real-
ized distribution if the game is repeated long enough without reaching a
steady state.
• Players’ estimations for equal or higher type players’ choices are bene-
fitted from observing equal or higher type players’ possible correlation,
especially the perfect correlation between same type players.
First, with full information structure, players can track all other players’
all previous play records, so they can detect the correct number of lower type
players much more quickly than with the aggregate information structure.
Players are even able to infer identities of lower type players. Also, unlike the
aggregate information structure, players can correct their wrong guess on the
realized cognitive types when the realized number of players for some lower
type is greater than what is predicted by p. Second, with full information
structure, players can use information about the correlation between equal
or higher type players’ past choices. Therefore, players utilize additional
information with the full information structure in meaningful ways.
In sum, players use both deductive and inductive reasoning to anticipate
other players’ choices and maximize current period’s expected utility. Players
use deductive reasoning to correctly anticipate lower type players’ choices,
and they use inductive reasoning to utilize past data for equal or higher type
players’ choices. As the base game G is repeated, players update their data
to utilize the most recent data and discard the oldest one. Also, players’
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estimations of the realized cognitive type distribution are corrected as the
game is repeated. Note that with aggregate information structure, only with
the case when the realized number of a lower type is strictly less than what is
predicted by the common prior p, a k type player might be able to detect the
discrepancy and fix qtk,`. On the other hand, with full information structure,
if the game is repeated enough without reaching steady state, players might
be able to reach the correct realization of cognitive types by observing enough
past data. Also note that players are assumed to behave in a way that ignore
reputation effects in the repeated game. Players are in a sense myopic so that
they maximize per period utilities at each period.
Then consider the convergence of the dynamic. The modified CH model
is different from traditional treatments of fictitious play or replicator dynam-
ics so that it is a discrete time dynamic defined on finite games. I define
convergence of the modified CH model dynamic as follows:
Definition 12. A modified CH model dynamic converges if there exists a
natural number T such that a k type player’s choice atk stays the same after
all periods t ∈ {T, T + 1, T + 2, . . . , } for all k ∈ K.
Therefore, a modified CH model might converge even when players have
wrong beliefs about the realized cognitive types. Note that similar to other
learning dynamics, the modified CH dynamic may not converge. Then I
observe the following:
Proposition 6. When the modified CH model dynamic converges, it con-
verges to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The following proof works for both the aggregate information struc-
ture and the full information structure. Assume that a modified CH model
dynamics converges, so all type players’ choices converge. Therefore, for
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every vectors  > 0, ∃ a natural number M such that
ctk −  ≤ ct+1k ≤ ctk +  (3.3)
for all t > M , and for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}. Note that from the definition of etk
and Etk for both aggregate and full information structure, players’ estimation
for perceived equal or higher types must be in the close range of their actual
choices after period M , by (3.3). Therefore, players’ anticipations about
all other players’ choices converge to their actual choices after long enough
periods. That does not depend on whether players have correct estimation of
the realized cognitive types or not. Even if a player i misunderstands another
lower type player j as a higher type, player i’s estimation of player j’s choices
is congruent to what player j actually chooses. Then we can conclude that
when the modified CH model dynamics converges, at the convergence point,
all players maximize their expected payoffs and their expectations about all
other players are congruent to the actual choices made by them.
3.3 Comparison with Other Models
In this section, I compare the modified CH model with the original cognitive
hierarchy model and existing learning models. The modified cognitive hier-
archy model follows the original cognitive hierarchy model so that players
are endowed with cognitive types, which represent their iterative reasoning
abilities. But there are several important theoretical differences between the
original and modified CH models.
First, unlike the original CH model, the cognitive type space has a com-
mon prior. As explained in the introduction, there are little theoretical rea-
sons to discard the common prior assumption when we try to explain real
world players’ behavior with limited cognitive hierarchy. Second, in the mod-
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ified CH model, there is no 0 type player. In the original CH model, level 0
players are not utility maximizers, but their choices are exogenously given.
In the modified cognitive hierarchy model, all players maximize expected
utilities given their expectations of other players, and players’ expectation
forming processes depend on their cognitive types, which represent their abil-
ities to perform iterative optimizations. Thus, in the modified CH model,
players are differentiated only by their cognitive abilities, not by the fact
that whether they are utility maximizers or not. Third, the modified CH
model suggests how players might utilize information about past play in re-
peated games with the limited cognitive hierarchy assumption. In modified
CH model, players use past choice data to estimate other higher type players’
choices, and also estimate realized distribution on the cognitive type space.
Also, we can see that with more information, (full information structure
compared to the aggregate information structure) players’ estimations are
corrected faster. On the other hand, with the original CH model, the past
play data has no meaning and players don’t utilize it, and that conclusion is
rejected by empirical evidences as shown in section 5.
Then I compare the modified CH model with existing learning models in
the economics literature. In the modified CH model, players are assumed to
use past data to predict equal or higher type players’ choices. Therefore in
the repeated game, players use partial learning for other players’ choices.10
Note that there is a large literature about learning in game theory, with two
broad categories: replicator dynamics (evolutionary models) and fictitious
play.
The idea of replicator dynamics is adapted to the game theory from the
theory of evolution in biology. In replicator dynamics, players are endowed
10Players only use learning partially in the sense that they utilize past data only for
equal or higher type players. Players are assumed to be able to correctly deduce lower
type players’ choices, so learning is not needed for anticipations of lower type players’
actions.
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with propensities to play certain actions. Therefore, players’ types are defined
to be their strategy choices, and players do not maximize utilities: they
simply choose actions according to their given propensity. As the game is
played repeatedly, player types that enjoy higher utilities grow more rapidly
(reinforced) than types with low utilities. Thus, realized distribution of types
respond to payoffs given by G and evolve according to them. Bo¨rgers and
Sarin (1997) showed that a learning model converges to a replicator dynamic
in continuous time limit, thereby interpreting the replicator dynamics as a
learning model.
The modified cognitive hierarchy model is different from the replicator
dynamics in several important ways. First, the modified CH model assumes
that players know the game G and maximize utilities, whereas replicator
dynamic assumes either players don’t know G including the payoff structure,
or players are not utility maximizers but they are programmed to play certain
actions. Thus, the modified CH model is closer to the standard assumptions
in game theory and the model explains what happens when players know the
environment and the game they are playing, and maximize expected utilities.
Second, the modified CH model puts meaningful restrictions to the initial
condition of players’ choices, providing rationale for chosen initial conditions.
In the replicator dynamic, players’ choices at period 1 is randomly assigned
without much reason why certain players are assigned to certain actions at
period 1. Note that the evolutionary dynamic and the convergence point (if
the dynamic converges) may depend on the initial conditions. Therefore, with
replicator dynamics, if there are multiple convergence points depending on
different initial condition choices, then it is hard to justify one over the other.
On the other hand, in the modified CH model, players’ choices at period 1
are explained to be consequences of utility maximization and their cognitive
limits. When there are multiple convergence points of a modified CH model
depending on different initial conditions, different initial conditions can be
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explained to have different cognitive type distributions or different period 1
estimations. Thus, with the modified CH model, it is easier to find rationale
for preferring one initial condition or one convergence point over the other.
Related to that, there are restrictions on the set of possible choices at pe-
riod 1 (that initial choices must be justified by a utility maximization and
a cognitive type distribution), so that the modified CH model would pro-
vide a sharper prediction of given repeated game compared to the replicator
dynamic. Note that with a fixed initial conditions and learning trajectory,
players’ overall utilities depend on their initial choices and their adjustment
processes in both learning models. The modified CH model provides expla-
nations about players’ initial choices, their adjustment processes, and their
overall utilities for given game.
There is a different class of learning models: fictitious play. Fudenberg
and Levine (1998) summarize literature on fictitious play. In fictitious play,
players maximize per period expected utilities, anticipating other players’
choices solely by their previous play records. Therefore, in fictitious play,
players only use inductive reasoning to form expectations about other players,
whereas in the modified CH model, players use both inductive and deductive
reasoning. An important underlying assumption of the fictitious play is that
players assume that other players’ choices are given by a fixed distribution,
so that they try to estimate that unknown distribution by accumulating past
data. In forming such expectation, players assume that all other players are
of the same nature: there is no “cognitive types” that differentiates players.
Also, in the fictitious play, players do not recognize that all other players
use past data for estimation and maximize utility. In a sense, fictitious play
assumes that players have the “wrong model” about other players’ choice
procedures. On the other hand, in the modified CH model, players have a
better understanding of other players’ choices. In the modified CH model,
players correctly know that other players use both inductive and deductive
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reasoning for estimation and maximize utility. Players utilize past data be-
cause of their cognitive limits. Another difference between the fictitious play
and the modified CH model is the same with the second reason in the pre-
vious paragraph: the modified CH model provides reasonable restrictions on
players’ initial choices, thus providing explanations for initial choices.
As a behavioral model, the modified CH model should be justified by
empirical evidences. Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) explain that the original
CH model provides better explanation for the one-shot beauty contest game
compared to the Nash equilibrium theory. The modified CH model improves
the original CH model in that it provides better explanation for repeated
beauty contest game. The explanation for repeated beauty contest game
and comparison with the original CH model is provided in section 5. Duffy
and Hopkins (2005) use existing learning models (the replicator dynamics
and the fictitious play) to explain the empirical evidences of the repeated
market entry game. Even if they justify some of experimental results with
existing learning models, they acknowledge that there are some results that
might not be explained. In section 6, I explain that the modified CH model
might be able to provide answers for their questions.
3.4 The Repeated Beauty Contest Game
In this section, I describe the repeated beauty contest game, the prediction
of the modified CH model, and the comparisons of the modified CH model
and other models.
I present the beauty contest game as in Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004)
and Sbriglia (2009). N players play the beauty contest game repeatedly as
follows. Sbriglia (2009) chooses relatively large N , N = 38 or N = 125 in
the experiments. Thus in this section, I assume that the realized distribution
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of the cognitive type space is congruent to what is given by p. In each
period t = {1, 2, . . .}, each player simultaneously chooses a multiple of 1/1000
between 0 and 100.11 After players choose their numbers, then the average of
the players’ numbers are announced,12 and a player who is closest to 2/3 of
the average wins a fixed prize. If there are multiple winners, then the prize is
evenly shared. Then the game is moved to t + 1 period and repeated. Note
that in both Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) and Sbriglia (2009), players
are only informed about the average choice of all players, thus excluding the
possibility of the modified CH model analysis with full information structure.
I will introduce distributional assumptions that makes analysis in this
section simpler. In the original CH model, players’ types are drawn from a
Poisson distribution, and a t type player mistakenly believes that all other
players’ types are distributed according to a normalized Poisson distribution,
from type 0 to type t − 1.13 In this section for the repeated beauty contest






for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}.
Also I fix players’ estimations for equal or higher type players’ choices at
period 1 as follows:
11Note that due to the given restriction, A is a finite set.
12Note that the information given for repeated beauty contest game provides the aggre-
gate information structure, but not the full information structure.
13Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) explain that they choose Poisson distribution for two
reasons. First, Poisson distribution has only one parameter, λ, so it is easy to handle.
Second, they think it is plausible that as k rises, fewer and fewer players do the next step
of thinking beyond k.
14I choose the uniform distribution mainly because it is easy to handle with one param-
eter K.
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Assumption 5. All players estimate equal or higher type players’ choices to
be equal to 50 at period 1.
The original CH model is first introduced to explain the difference be-
tween the Nash equilibrium theory prediction and real world choices of play-
ers with a one-shot beauty contest game. That is, in experiments, real world
players do not choose 0, which is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, but
they choose numbers substantially greater than 0. The CH model explains
that real world players are not perfectly rational, but they have limited itera-
tive reasoning abilities. In the CH model, the actual choices players make are
explained by proper choice of the parameter, λ. Note that with modified CH
model, players will also choose numbers substantially greater than 0 in an
one-shot beauty contest game. Similar to the original CH model, the actual
choices players make can be explained by proper choice of parameters, K.
The modified CH model improves over the original CH model in explain-
ing the repeated beauty contest game. In the real world experiment, as
the beauty contest game is repeated, players’ choices rapidly approach the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome, zero, as Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004)
and Sbriglia (2009) observe. With the assumptions of the original CH model,
the only possible explanation is that players’ cognitive types are rapidly in-
creasing as the beauty contest game is repeated. But such an explanation is
implausible because it is unlikely that a player’s iterative reasoning ability in-
creases substantially during the short amount of time with which the beauty
contest game is repeated in the experimental setting. With the modified
CH model, players use deductive reasoning to estimate lower type players’
choices, and use inductive reasoning to estimate equal or higher type players’
choices. Note that with Sbriglia’s (2009) choice of N = 38 or N = 125, it
might be safe to assume that the realized distribution of the cognitive types
is the same with the common prior. Then as a result of learning by the past
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data on choices of equal or higher type players, the model predicts that the
average of players’ choices will approach to zero. Denote the average of all
players’ choices at period t as mt.
Proposition 7. lim
t→∞
mt = 0, so that all players will eventually choose 0 in
finite time.
Proof. First, I use induction to prove that etk+1 ≤ etk and atk+1 < atk for
all t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, and for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K − 1}, and also atk < etk for
all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}. Note that e1k+1 = e1k = 50 and a1k+1 < a1k for all
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K − 1}. Assume that ej−1k+1 ≤ ej−1k and atk+1 < atk for all






































































first inequality by inductive hypothesis and second inequality by (3.6).
Thus we know that atk < e
t
k. Now, denote the average choice of types





























by (3.6) and (3.7). Thus we have etk+1 ≤ etk and atk+1 < atk for all t ∈
{1, 2, . . .}, and for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K − 1} and also atk < etk for all k ∈
{1, 2, . . . , K}.
Therefore, we know that the average of all players’ choices at period t,
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There are several notable points in the proof of Proposition 2. First,
it is important that players completely replace old data to new data every
I periods. If players continue to utilize part of old data, then we cannot
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guarantee that mt approaches 0.15 Related to that, note that mt is decreased
less than 2
3
every I periods. That is natural since players use I block of past
data when they try to estimate equal or higher type players’ choices, and
response to them. In a sense, players’ observations of other players’ past
choices replace one round of deductive reasoning in the iterative reasoning
process. Therefore, when the game is repeated, utilization of new data works
so that players’ choices approach to the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
Also, we can see that by Proposition 2, the unique convergent point of the
repeated beauty contest game is globally stable.
Note that for the repeated beauty contest game, players’ choices will
approach to the Nash equilibrium outcome faster when players use more
weights on the most recent data. In the extreme, the convergence will be
fastest when I = 1, so players estimate equal or higher type players’ choices
only by their choices of just one period before. That is because of the special
feature of the beauty contest game: as the reasoning process is repeated,
players’ optimal choices are monotone decreasing. However, the same might
not be said with different types of games and some other rules of estimation
might induce faster convergence compared to the estimation rule that only
use the latest data. For example, in the financial market, moving averages
and old data are often used by investors who perform technical analysis.
Sbriglia’s (2009) experimental results on the repeated beauty contest
game could be interpreted as supporting the theory of the modified CH
model. Sbriglia conducts repeated beauty contest game experiments with
two different treatments. In the first treatment, only the average number
of all players’ choices is announced at the end of each period. That is con-
gruent to the aggregate information structure of this paper. In the second
15For example, assume that players continue to partly use the data m1 > 0 when making
estimations of equal or higher type players’ choices, and the weight players give to m1 does
not converge to zero. Then mt 6→ 0.
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“information” treatment, the winners are asked to provide explanation of
their reasoning to choose winning number, and all other players are informed
about the winner’s explanation. In the second treatment, players are given
more information compared to the aggregate information structure, but not
the same as in the full information structure in this paper. Then Sbriglia
finds that in both treatments, players’ choices converge to the Nash equilib-
rium outcome. Note that the modified CH model predicts convergence in
both treatments, thus the modified CH model’s prediction is supported by
the experimental evidences. Also, Sbriglia (2009) observes that in the second
treatment with more information, the convergence is faster. The explana-
tion of the winner’s iterative reasoning might help other players’ reasoning
process so that other players’ cognitive types might increase. Without such
explanation and help from the winner, players’ cognitive types are not likely
to increase in short amount of time as I explained earlier about the reason
why original CH model is insufficient to explain the convergence to Nash
equilibrium in repeated beauty contest model.
Then I observe the theoretical predictions of other learning models for
the repeated beauty contest game, and compare them with the predictions
of the modified CH model. It is easy to see that both the replicator dynam-
ics and the fictitious play will predict that all players’ choices will converge
to the unique Nash equilibrium outcome as the beauty contest game is re-
peated. However, the replicator dynamics or the fictitious play does not
provide proper explanation of players’ choices at the first period. As pointed
out before, in other learning models, players’ first period choices are exoge-
nously decided. Recall that the motivation of the original CH model is to
explain players’ first period choices of the beauty contest game. The modified
CH model provides not only the explanation of players’ first period choices
by cognitive types, but also the convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium
when the game is repeated. In a sense, the modified CH model combines
107
the original CH model and other learning models in explaining the repeated
beauty contest game.
3.5 The Repeated Market Entry Game
In this section, I describe the repeated market entry game, the theoretical
prediction by the modified CH model, and the experimental findings in the
literature. I explain that the modified CH model provides good explanation
of empirical results presented by Duffy and Hopkins (2005), comparing with
explanations by existing learning theories, the replicator dynamics and the
fictitious play.
I present the market entry game as in Erev and Rapport (1998) and Duffy
and Hopkins (2005). N players simultaneously decide whether to enter a
market, (e), or to stay out, (o). Player i’s payoff at period t is given by:
uti(o) = v (3.14)
uti(e) = v + r(c−m), (3.15)
where v, c, r are positive constants, 1 ≤ c < N and 0 ≤ m ≤ N is the
number of players who choose e at period t. Here, the constant c has the
interpretation as the capacity of the market. Therefore, the return to entry
exceeds the return to staying out if and only if m < c. Note that in all pure
strategy Nash equilibria of this game, between c and c − 1 agents enter the
market, and there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Note that we
can relabel e as 1, and o as 0, then the given game is an example of the
symmetric games described in section 2 with A ≡ {1, 0} ∈ R, and a player’s
utility depends on his own choices and the average of all players’ choices.
First, consider what will happen with full information structure with the
modified CH model. I am interested in whether and when the modified CH
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model dynamic converges to pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the modi-
fied CH dynamic process, the discrepancy between the number of perceived
lower type ` by higher type k, qtk,`, and the realized number of lower types `
are important in players’ estimation and maximization processes. With the
full information structure, if the dynamic is repeated long enough without
convergence, then players’ perceived lower types is likely to converge to the
realized types. That is because players will be able to compare more and
more repeated play records to the calculated lower types’ play. Note that
the only possible scenario that there exists a player whose estimation of the
cognitive type space keeps to be wrong when the dynamic does not reach a
convergence point is that when there are two different types k 6= k′, such that
atk = a
t
k′ for t = 1, 2, . . ., and we can expect such cases would rarely happen.
Excluding such scenarios, with full information structure, one of the fol-
lowings are realized as the game is repeated: either the dynamic converges
before all players’ estimations of the realized cognitive types coincide with
the actual realization, all players’ estimations of the realized cognitive type
space are adjusted to be correct without reaching a convergent point. The
purpose of the current analysis is to find out necessary conditions so that the
modified CH dynamics does not converge. Thus, I find such necessary con-
ditions when all players have come to the correct estimation of the realized
cognitive type space. The detailed discussions and explanations are given in
the Appendix. From the analysis, we can observe that the convergence of
the modified CH dynamics depend much on the realization of the cognitive
types of players. The modified CH dynamic might oscillate among multiple
states without converging, or the modified CH dynamic might converge fast.
Whether the dynamic converges or not, and also the speed of convergence
vary greatly depending on the realized cognitive type distribution.
Now, consider how the modified CH dynamic evolves differently with
the aggregate information structure. With the aggregate information struc-
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ture, players’ estimations about the realized cognitive types are corrected
much slower compared to the full information structure. Note that whether
the dynamic converges of not, and also the speed of convergence depend on
whether players have the correct estimation about the realized cognitive type
space. Therefore, the modified CH model predicts that the speed of conver-
gence would be slower with the aggregate information structure compared to
the full information structure, if the dynamic converges.
The theoretical predictions of modified CH model is that the repeated
market entry game might converge to pure strategy Nash equilibria where
some players permanently choose to enter, and other players stay out. Also,
the full information structure induces convergence more than the aggregate
information structure, and players utilize more information given by the full
information structure. As I will explain, the modified CH model provides
explanations for Duffy and Hopkins’ (2005) experimental results.
For the repeated market entry game, Duffy and Hopkins (2005) repeat
the market entry game 100 times for each session. The experimental question
for the repeated market entry game is, whether the game converges or not,
which equilibrium if it converges, and which model best explains real-world
players’ behavior.
Duffy and Hopkins (2005) conduct experiments with three different treat-
ments. In the first “limited information” treatment, subjects are repeatedly
asked to choose between e or o, without knowing the payoff function. The
subjects even didn’t know that they were playing games with other subjects.
In the second “aggregate information” treatment, subjects were informed of
the game and the payoff function for all players. Also, subjects were informed
the hypothetical payoff of choosing e even if they choose o in that period. In
the final “full information” treatment, additional to all information for the
aggregate treatment, subjects were also informed of the individual actions
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chosen by each of the other 5 players in the session; this information was not
available in other treatments.
Duffy and Hopkins (2005) analyze the repeated market entry game with
existing learning models and provides several theoretical predictions regard-
ing to their three different treatments. First, both the replicator dynamics
and the fictitious play predict that players’ choices converges to pure strategy
Nash equilibria. In addition, if players follow replicator dynamics, then all
three treatments should show no difference in the speed of convergence be-
cause all information that players need to know in the replicator dynamics is
provided in the limited information treatment. On the other hand, if players
follow fictitious play, then the aggregate information treatment and the full
information treatment should show same speed of convergence because all
information that players need to know in the fictitious play is provided in
the aggregate information treatment.16
Duffy and Hopkins (2005) draw several conclusions from experiments.
First, they observe that in the long run, players’ choices might converge
to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with some agents permanently in the
market, and some permanently out. Both of the replicator dynamics and the
fictitious play explain the tendency to the convergence to the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. However, Duffy and Hopkins’ (2005) experimental results
show that the process might not converge after 100 periods of the repeated
market entry game, and that might be seen as incongruent with existing
learning models.
Second, there are significant differences in the speed of convergence across
different treatments. In the limited information treatment, only after close
to 100 periods do subjects begin to approach equilibrium. Players’ choices
16Because players know the game in the aggregate information treatment and they are
informed about the hypothetical payoffs if they chose differently, they can deduce the
aggregate choice of other players in each period.
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converge faster in the aggregate information treatment, and even faster in
the full information treatment. Because of the differences of the speed of
convergence, the empirical results says that players do not entirely follow the
replicator dynamics, though they could partly follow it because the limited
information treatment does converge in the end. Also, because the conver-
gence speeds are significantly different between the aggregate information and
full information treatments, players are not considered as entirely following
the fictitious play. In fictitious play, all players have the same expectation
forming process such that they perceive all other players are of the same
nature, so the only meaningful information for the players in fictitious play
is the aggregate choice of all other players. There is no way to explain that
players might utilize other players’ individual choice data in the fictitious
play.
The modified CH model provides explanations for Duffy and Hopkins’
(2005) experimental results. First, the modified CH model predicts that the
repeated market entry game might converge to pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium, but the speed of convergence depends much on the realized cognitive
type distribution, the size of I, and shape of (Ai)i∈{1,2,...,I}. Therefore, the
modified CH model predicts large variance of the speed of convergence for
the repeated market entry game. That is exactly what Duffy and Hopkins’
(2005) experimental results show. Even with aggregate or full information
treatment, players’ choices might not converge after 100 periods, or even
when they converge, the speed of convergence varies greatly. On the other
hand, it is difficult to explain different speed of convergence with same infor-
mation structure by the fictitious play or the replicator dynamics.
Second, the modified CH model explains the empirical evidences that the
aggregate information treatment shows slower convergence speed compared
to the full information treatment. As explained before, in the modified CH
model, players do utilize more information about other players’ past individ-
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ual choices with the full information structure in two ways, compared to the
aggregate information structure. With individual choice data, players can
identify lower type players faster. Also, players can utilize the correlation
between equal or higher type players’ choices, especially the perfect correla-
tion between same type players. Thus, in one hand players can increase the
proportion of deductive reasoning (which is more accurate than the inductive
reasoning) more by correctly specifying the proportion of lower type players,
and on the other hand players can use inductive reasoning more efficiently
by having more information about equal or higher type players.
In addition, note that the modified CH model provides a possible expla-
nation for players’ initial choices. In other learning models, initial choices
of players are exogenously given. In contrast, the modified CH model says
that players’ initial choices are results of their utility maximization based on
some expectations. The details of players’ adjustment processes depend on
the realized cognitive type distributions and players’ first period estimations
of equal or higher type players.17
3.6 Conclusion
I presented a modified cognitive hierarchy model, which adds features of
learning to the original cognitive hierarchy model by Camerer, Ho and Chong
(2004). Players are endowed with cognitive types, which characterize their
cognitive limits. A k type player can only perform iterative optimization k
times. The cognitive type space has a common prior, so players knows the
existence of equal or higher type players, even the realized distribution of cog-
nitive types might be different from the prior. Players can follow lower type
17Duffy and Hopkins (2005) does not provide full data of players’ individual choice
history. In the future, more suitable experiments of the repeated market entry game
might be conducted to compare the theoretical predictions of the modified CH model to
real world players’ choice dynamics.
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players’ reasonings and correctly anticipate their choices, but they cannot
follow equal or higher type players’ reasonings and perform maximization.
Therefore, players are assumed to use past choice data of equal or higher
type players’ choices to estimate their current period choices. It is shown
that if the modified CH model dynamics converge, it converges to a Nash
equilibrium. Also, it is not likely that the modified CH model dynamics
converge to an equilibrium that involves indifference. When the modified
CH model dynamics converge to a strict Nash equilibrium, it is likely to be
locally stable if the number of players is large or players use wide moving
average of past data to estimate equal or higher type players’ choices.
The new model is motivated by the fact that whereas the original CH
model explains well about the discrepancy between the empirical findings
of the one-shot beauty contest model and the Nash equilibrium prediction,
the original CH model’s explanation for the empirical results of the repeated
beauty contest model is not satisfactory. The modified CH model can explain
the experimental findings that with repeated beauty contest game, players’
choices converge to the unique Nash equilibrium. That finding cannot be
explained by the original CH model.
Because the modified CH model explains what happens in the repeated
game play when players are involved with learning, it is important that how
is the model different from existing learning models: the replicator dynamics
and the fictitious play. The modified CH model have different assumptions
about players’ knowledge about the game and behavior compared to other
learning models, so that the new model might be used for explaining real-
world phenomena that are not fit to be explained by other learning models.
Also, the new model have different interpretations and explanations about
initial conditions/choices of players and how players utilize different level of
information given to them.
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I present some experimental results from the literature, and discuss how
to interpret those results with the modified CH model. Sbriglia (2009) re-
ports that in experiments of repeated beauty contest game, players’ choices
converge to the Nash equilibrium over time, and the speed of convergence
is faster when players have additional information about the winner’s ratio-
nale for choosing the winning number. The modified CH model explains the
convergence and provides plausible reasons for the difference in the speed
of convergence, thus improving the original CH model. Duffy and Hopkins
(2009) conduct experiments on the repeated market entry game, with three
different information treatments. The modified CH model provides better
explanation for some of their experimental findings compared to existing
learning models.
The modified CH model makes an innovation about how to model play-
ers’ cognitive limits, and how to analyze some real phenomena. Even with
cognitive limits, real world players might acknowledge that there are other
players who have higher types than themselves. In the new model, learning
and inductive reasoning is only used to assist the imperfect deductive rea-
soning in the presence of the cognitive limits. Real world players might use
learning to estimate other players’ behavior that are incomprehensible due
to cognitive limits. Also, when more information is given about other play-
ers’ choices, real world players might be able to utilize it to improve their
estimations. The modified CH model might provide better explanation of
real-world players’ behavior than both the original CH model, and existing
learning models for some situations.
In the future, the modified CH model might be extended for repeated
incomplete information games and extensive form games. Also, it might be
interesting to see the consequences of different expectation forming rules to
the prediction of the model. In this paper, I used experimental results found
in literature for the repeated beauty contest game and the market entry
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game. In the future, more suitable experiments might be designed to identify
in which cases the modified CH model provides good explanations, and in
which other cases it does not. Also, for given repeated game, individual
players’ play records might be tracked to estimate his or her cognitive type
in the modified CH model. With such experimental findings, the modified
CH model would have much more support.
116
Bibliography
[1] T. Bo¨rgers and R. Sarin (1997): “Learning Through Reinforcement and
Replicator Dynamics,” Journal of Economic Theory 77, 1-14.
[2] C. Camerer, T. Ho, and J. Chong (2004): “A Cognitive Hierarchy Model
of Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3), 861-898.
[3] M. Costa-Gomes, V. Crawford, and B. Broseta (2001): “Cognition and
Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,” Economet-
rica 39, 1193-1235.
[4] J. Duffy and E. Hopkins (2005): “Learning, Information and Sorting
in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence,” Games and Economic
Behavior.
[5] I. Erev and A. Rapoport (1998): “Coordination, “magic”, and reinforce-
ment learning in a market entry game,” Games and Economic Behavior,
23, 146-175.
[6] D. Fudenberg and D.K.Levine (1998): “The Theory of Learning in
Games,” M.I.T. Press.
[7] J. Maynard-Smith (1974): “The Theory of Games and the Evolution of
Animal Conflicts,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 47, 209-221.
117
[8] R. Nagel (1995): “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental
Study,” American Economic Review 65, 1313-1326.
[9] M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein (1994): “A Course in Game Theory,”
MIT Press
[10] P. Sbriglia (2008): “Revealing the depth of reasoning in p-beauty-contest
games,” Experimental Economics 11, 107-121.
[11] D. Stahl and P. Wilson (1995): “On Players’ Model of Other Players:




Analysis of the Repeated
Market Entry Game by the
Modified CH Model
In the appendix, I provide some explanations for the theoretical predic-
tions of the repeated market entry game.
Consider the choice of parameter values for the repeated market entry
game. Duffy and Hopkins (2005) conduct experiments of repeated market
entry game with different levels of information about previous play, which will
be explained later. In their experiments, they used parameters N = 6, v =
8, r = 2, c = 2.1. Thus, in all pure strategy Nash equilibria, the equilibrium
is strict and there are 2 players choosing e and 4 players choosing o. In the
following analysis of the repeated market entry game, I maintain parametric
assumptions of Duffy and Hopkins (2005), so that N = 6, v = 8, r = 2, c =
2.1.
First, assume the full information structure. As explained in the main
text, I will only consider the cases where all players have correct estimations
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of the realized cognitive type distribution. Then the convergence depends on
the realized distribution of the cognitive types. For example, assume that
there are 2 realized cognitive types with 3 players each. Then the modified
CH dynamic does not converge because same type players always choose the
same action, so that the dynamic can’t converge to a state where only 2
players choose e and 4 players choose o with given realized type distribution.
Then we have the following observation.
Observation 10. The modified CH dynamic for given repeated market entry
game will converge to pure strategy Nash equilibria only if one of the following
conditions are satisfied:
• There is a type k such that there are 2 players with k as the realized
cognitive type.
• There are two types k and k′ such that one player is assigned for each
of the types.
Note that the observation suggests only necessary conditions for the con-
vergence. As we will see, the modified CH dynamic might not converge even
with one of the listed necessary conditions satisfied.
We want to point out conditions for the case where the modified CH
model dynamic does not converge. Due to the length concern, I will only
consider when the first condition in Observation 4 is satisfied so that there
is a type k¯ such that there are 2 players with k¯ type, and the k¯ type is
the highest type among all players. The following analysis shows that the
modified CH dynamic is likely to converge with such an assumption, and the
dynamic rarely ends up with a cycle. For the other possible realized type
distributions when conditions in Observation 4 are satisfied, the analysis is
similar to conduct.
Consider the earliest period t such that all player types’ estimations of
number of lower type players are congruent to the realization of such types.
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With the assumption that there is the highest type k¯ with exactly 2 players, I
will contemplate the dynamics of the modified CH model with every possible
states in terms of realized cognitive types and each types’ choices at t.
For all possible realization of cognitive types, note that if there are exactly
2 players choosing e and 4 players choosing o at period t, then the dynamic
came to a convergence point at period t regardless of the identity of types
who choose e. If a lowest type player chose e in period t, then he will choose
e in period t + 1 because when he choose e at period t, the previous play
records of all other players supported the choice of e. Then at period t + 1,
the previous play record of period t is added to the belief updating procedure,
and the record of period t supports the choice of e because in period t, only
one other player chose e. On the other hand, if a lowest type player chose
o in period t, then he will choose o in period t + 1 by the similar reasoning.
All players will know what lower type players will choose in period t+ 1, and
use previous records for equal or higher type players’ choices. In period t+1,
all type players will choose the same action as in period t due to the similar
reasoning. Thus I will exclude the cases where exactly 2 players choosing e
at period t in the following observations.
Also note that it is not possible that all players choose o. If all lower type
players choose o, then the k¯ type players will choose e because for a k¯ type
player, the maximum number of choice e by all other players is 1. Then all
remaining possible states regarding to choices of players at period t with k¯
as the highest type are given as follows.
• 3 players with types lower than k¯ choose e and k¯ type players choose
o. (state 1)
• 4 players with types lower than k¯ choose e and k¯ type players choose
o. (state 2)
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• 1 player with types lower than k¯ chooses e and k¯ type players choose
e. (state 3)
• 1 player with types lower than k¯ chooses e and k¯ type players choose
o. (state 4)
Figure 3.1: Possible dynamics from (state 1).
Start with (state 1). Figure 1 summarizes what happens from (state 1).
There are 2 possibilities for 3 players with lower types who chose e: either
all 3 players are of the same type (state 1-1), or there is 1 lowest type player
and 2 players with a higher type (state 1-2).1 In (state 1-1), there are two
possible type distributions: either there is a player with lower type than the 3
players who choose e (state 1-1-1), or there is a player whose type is between
the 3 players who choose e and k¯ type players (state 1-1-2). In state (1-1-1),
in periods t+ 1, if the 3 players with e update data at period t so that they
switch to o, then the type k¯ will choose e and the dynamic converges. The 1
1If there is a lowest type with 2 players and a higher type with 1 player, then the higher
type won’t choose e after correctly anticipating that the lowest type players would choose
e. Therefore, it is not possible 3 players choosing e with 2 lowest type players and 1 higher
type player. Also, the logic is similar if all 3 players are of different types.
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player with lowest type will still choose o in period t+ 1 because after period
t’s observation, his choice of o is reinforced by observing 3 players choosing
e in period t. If in periods t+ 1, 3 players with e will still choose e, then all
players’ choices of period t + 1 will be the same as period t. As the game
is repeated and the data is accumulated with 3 players choosing e, 3 players
will switch to o before period t + I because their data will be completely
replaced every I periods. Then at that period when those 3 players switch, k¯
type players will choose e and the dynamic converges. In state (1-1-2), again
as the game is repeated, 3 players will switch to o before period t + I. At
the period when the 3 players switch to o, the 1 player whose type is just
below k¯ type might choose e or o. If he chooses o, then k¯ type chooses e and
the dynamic converges. If the 1 player chooses e when 3 players switch to
o, then the state goes to the same as in (state 3) or (state 4), and possible
scenarios for (state 3) and (state 4) will be discussed shortly.
Consider the case (state 1-2). Similar to (state 1-1), 3 players who chose
e in period t will eventually wish to switch to o before period t + I, but
different types’ incentives might be different. There are 3 possibilities: either
all 3 players will simultaneously switch to o at some period t+j (state 1-2-1),
or only the 1 player with lowest type will switch to o and 2 players will stay
at e at t + j (state 1-2-2), or the 1 player with lowest type stay at e and 2
players switch to o at t+ j (state 1-2-3).2 First consider (state 1-2-1). There
are 3 possible type distributions: either the 1 other player is of the lowest
type (state 1-2-1-1), the 1 other player’s type is between those who chose e
(state 1-2-1-2), or the 1 other player is just below type k¯ (state 1-2-1-3). In
(state 1-2-1-1) and (state 1-2-1-2), when 3 players switch to o at period t+ j,
the 1 other player will still choose o because he uses data of periods up to
t+ j−1 that reinforces his choice of o. Then the k¯ type players choose e and
the dynamic converges. In (state 1-2-1-3), at period t+ j, either the 1 other
2Note that j ≤ I due to players’ belief updating process given as in Assumption 3.
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player chooses o and the dynamic converges, or the 1 other player chooses
e and the state goes to the same as in (state 3) or (state 4). Now consider
(state 1-2-2). At period t+ j where only 1 player switches from e to o, the 1
other player who chose o will still choose o.3 k¯ type players will also choose
o and the dynamic converges. In (state 1-2-3), the dynamic might converge
if the 1 other player who chose o at period t+ j − 1 is of the type just below
k¯ and chooses e at period t+ j. Then players with k¯ type chooses o and the
dynamic converges. Otherwise, the state goes to the same as in (state 3) or
(state 4).
Figure 3.2: Possible dynamics from (state 2).
Then move to (state 2). Figure 2 summarizes what happens from (state
2). There are 2 possibilities: either all 4 players are of the same type (state
2-1), or there is 1 player with lowest type who chooses e and 3 higher type
players who choose e (state 2-2).4 In (state 2-1), the lowest type players will
switch to o before period t+I, and when they switch, the dynamic converges
3If the 1 other player who chose o in period t+ j − 1 is of the lowest type or the type
in between the players who chose e in period t+ j− 1, then he will still choose o at period
t + j because the data up to period t + j − 1 reinforces the choice of o. If the 1 other
player is of type just below k¯, then he will choose o at period t + j because he correctly
anticipates 2 lower type players choose e at that period.
4Again, if the cognitive type distribution is such that if there is 2 or 3 players with
lowest type who choose e, then the remaining higher type players will not choose e.
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with k¯ type players choosing e. In (state 2-2), at some later period t + j,
either all players switch to o so that the dynamic converges (state 2-2-1), or
only the lowest type player switches to o and the dynamic goes to state as
same in (state 1-1-1) and eventually converges (state 2-2-2), or only 3 players
switches to o and the dynamic goes to states as same in (state 3) or (state
4) - (state 2-2-3).
Figure 3.3: Possible dynamics from (state 3) and (state 4).
Figure 3 summarizes what happens from (state 3) and (state 4). Consider
(state 3). Note that as long as 3 players who chose e keep choosing e, the
3 players who chose o will continue to choose o in later periods. Then there
are 2 possibilities: at some period t + j, either only the lower type player
switches to o and k¯ type players choose e so that the dynamic converges -
(state 3-1), or only k¯ type players switches to o so that the dynamic goes to
the state as same in (state 4) - (state 3-2).
Consider (state 4). As the game is repeated, at some period t+ j, either
the k¯ type players switch to e (state 4-1) so that the dynamic goes to the
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state as same in (state 3), or some number of lower type players switch to
e. There are 3 possibilities for possible future switch of lower type players
who chose o in period t: at some later period t+ j, either 1 more lower type
player switch to e so the dynamic converges - (state 4-2), or 2 more lower
type players switch to e so the state goes as same with (state 1) - (state 4-3),
or 3 more lower type players switch to e so the state goes as same with (state
2) - (state 4-4).
Figure 3.4: All possible cycles.
From the observations of Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, we can detect
possible cycles. I will explain that some cycle scenarios are impossible so
that they must be excluded from consideration. First, note that the cycle
between (state 3-2) and (state 4-1) is impossible. The change from (state
3-2) to (state 4-1) and the change from (state 4-1) to (state 3-2) are exactly
the opposite: in the former case, there is 1 lower type who keeps playing e
and k¯ type players switch from e to o, and in the latter case, there is 1 lower
type who keeps playing o and k¯ type players switch from o to e. If the former
case happens, then it means k¯ type players have accumulated more past data
to switch from e to o compared to the 1 lower type player, so if the game is
repeated, the latter case cannot happen. Second, the cycle initiating from
(state 1-1-2) is also impossible. The only way that (state 1-1-2) ends up with
cycling is to reach (state 4-3) so that the dynamic goes back to (state 1), but
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the distributional assumptions of (state 1-1-2) and (state 4-3) are different.5
Third, the cycle initiating from (state 2-2-3) is also impossible. The only way
that (state 2-2-3) ends up cycling is the dynamic oscillates between (state
2-2-3) and (state 4-4), with possible deviations to (state 3-2). However, the
switch from (state 2-2-3) to (state 4) and the switch from (state 4-4) to (state
2-2-3) is exactly the opposite. Note that the distribution must be there is 1
player with lowest type and 3 player with higher type. When (state 2-2-3)
moves to (state 4), 1 lowest type player keeps choosing e, and 3 higher type
players switch from e to o, and when (state 4-4) moves to (state 2), 1 lowest
type player keeps choosing e and 3 higher type players switch from o to e.
Players’ past choice data cannot support oscillating between those 2 states,
even with occasional deviation to (state 3-2) because k¯ type players’ choice
data are utilized in the same way by 1 lowest type player and 3 higher type
players.
Therefore, there are only 2 possible cognitive type distributions and sce-
narios that the modified CH model ends up oscillating among 4 different
states with k¯ type being the highest as follows:
• The realized cognitive type space is such that among 4 players with
lower types than k¯, there is 1 player with a lowest type, 2 players with
middle type, and 1 player with higher type. The dynamic oscillates
among (state 1-2-1-3), (state 3-2), (state 4-1), and (state 4-3).
• The realized cognitive type space is such that among 4 players with
lower types than k¯, there is 1 player with lowest type, 1 player with
middle type, and 2 players with higher type. The dynamic oscillates
among (state 1-2-3), (state 3-2), (state 4-1) and (state 4-3).
5At (state 1-1-2), all 3 players who choose e are of the same type, and at (state 4-3),
the dynamic moves back to (state 1) only if just 2 of 3 players who chose o switches to e.
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Figure 4 summarizes all possible cycles that are described above. Note
that compared to all possible cognitive type distributions and all possible
trajectories depending on initial conditions given k¯ highest type with 2 play-
ers, the above 2 cases are rare. For other possibilities that satisfy one of the
necessary conditions given in Observation 4, such as when the k¯ type with 2
players is the lowest type or in the middle, the dynamic analysis is similar.
I expect that cycles also rarely happen.
While in the repeated beauty contest model, players with highest cog-
nitive types always perform better than lower type players, in the repeated
market entry game, it might not be the case.6
6For example, consider the dynamic from (state 1-2-2) in the previous explanation.
The dynamic ends up with the convergent point where k¯ type players ends up choosing
o, and 2 lower type players choosing e, enjoying higher per-period payoffs than k¯ types.
If players are patient enough, the aggregate expected utilities for those lower type players
exceed the utilities for k¯ type players, who have the highest type.
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